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ABSTRACT
Climate change poses an unprecedented risk to global human security and future
generations. Yet actions to mitigate or adapt to the changing climate system vary
greatly among countries and their constituencies. Despite mounting evidence detailing
the economic, social, and ecological risks of climate change, many scholars agree that
the greatest threats associated with climate change involve delaying or ignoring
necessary action. Using theorizing of “risk society” from Ulrich Beck and others, this
thesis examines how countries, environmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and business interests construct the risk of climate change and how their
respective discourses conflict in international environmental negotiations. This research
uses computer-assisted qualitative data analysis to explore statements submitted by
each of these constituencies to the sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP) for the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2010.
Analysis of these texts identifies climate change discourse as crisis or opportunity, in
addition to discourses of development, environmentalism, and rights or responsibilities
to provide us a better understanding of how we perceive and respond to ecological risk.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Climate change is the most persistent threat to global stability of this century. Its
impacts are felt worldwide – from rising sea levels to more extreme weather conditions.
While climate change poses an unprecedented risk to human security and future
generations, our actions to mitigate and adapt to (or ignore) these documented adverse
impacts of climate change vary greatly among countries and their constituencies.
Despite mounting evidence detailing the economic, social, and ecological risks of
climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014; Stern,
2006; Gosling et al., 2011) many “experts agree that the greatest risk associated with
climate change is pretending that the problem does not exist, or that it does not require
our immediate attention and action” (Mills, 2012, p. 67).
This thesis asks whether explanations for such divergent responses to climate
change could lie in analyzing risk perceptions, which influence our orientation and
actions toward these global hazards (Beck, Block, Tyfield & Zhang, 2013; Leiserowitz,
2006; O’Connor, Bord & Fisher, 1999; Welsh, 1996; Wood & Vedlitz, 2007). Indeed,
German sociologist Ulrich Beck assumed “risk leads a dubious, insidious, would-be,
allusive existence: it is existent and non-existent, present and absent, doubtful and
suspect” (2009, p. 188). For Beck (2009), risk became “the central way of constituting
and organizing society” as we moved toward modernity (p. 160). Equally, for many
environmental scholars, risk has offered an ontological framework for studying social
processes, cultural attitudes, and policymaking related to climate change. That is
because risk does not standalone; it is a socially constructed phenomena linked to
1

governance and discourse (Beck, 2010a; Rothe, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 2000). As
such, “risk issues are defined in the public sphere by the contest of contending forces”
(McGuigan, 2006, p. 215).
This thesis contains six chapters, the first of which gives an overview of the
paper’s structure. Chapter 2 provides a literature review on construction and perception
of risk as it relates to environmental issues. Chapter 3 offers background on the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which this thesis
argues is one of the best arenas to study risk perceptions of climate change. In its 23year history, the UNFCCC has established a legitimate international regime through
numerous formal and informal negotiations to implement transnational agreements
aimed at mitigating or adapting to the risks of climate change (Huang, 2009). Together
with hundreds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the UNFCCC involves nearly
200 countries meeting annually to “cooperatively consider what they could do to limit
average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change, and to cope
with whatever impacts were, by then, inevitable” (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2013). Chapter 4 provides a discussion of
the methodology utilized to examine documents submitted from UNFCCC
constituencies – countries and NGOs – during the Conference of the Parties (COP) 16
in 2010. Through discourse analysis of these high-level statements and submissions
from these constituencies in 2010, this thesis seeks to identify the risk perceptions of
countries and other key stakeholders in environmental negotiations aimed at curbing the
threats associated with climate change. Chapter 5 offers an analysis of the findings from
my computer-assisted data qualitative analysis of these documents to the UNFCCC
2

from countries and NGOs, and Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of what we can
learn from studying climate change risk perceptions.
1.1

Risk Society

Although the concepts of loss and damage associated with climate change
hazards are widely discussed, they are not clearly defined under the UNFCCC
(Surminski, Lopez, Birkmann, & Welle, 2012). In addition, “no comprehensive risk
assessment model for climate change loss and damage exists” (Surminski et al., 2012,
p. 3). Without such models, it is difficult for decision makers to understand capacity
needs, identify gaps, enhance action, or reduce vulnerability in their home countries.
Thus, stakeholders often rely on risk perceptions to help inform their intentions. Beck
famously argued that risk is a key aspect of late modernity, and our responses to risk
change over time (Bristow & Fitzgerald, 2011). Countries have developed a variety of
coping mechanisms to confront the risks that have evolved from industrialization and
modernization, according to Beck (Rothe 2011). But climate change has exceeded the
limits of national risk-management institutions, prompting a new risk society that must
“transcend the boundaries of national states and thus open up a window of opportunity
for a more cooperative international order to evolve” (Rothe, 2011, p. 332).
Beck’s work offers a conceptual starting point from which to examine questions
about contemporary environmental risk (Bulkeley, 2001). Yet, in this thesis, his
theorizing is supplemented with that of Rothe (2011) and Webb (2011) who also explore
the political impacts of different risk framing on global climate governance and the role
of countries and NGOs, as well as theories on the social amplification of risk by
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Kasperson et al. (1988). Additionally, this chapter reviews literature on the role of
science in risk assessment and climate policy and explores the paradoxically
democratizing and disproportionate effects of climate change – that is, while adverse
impacts are seen worldwide, some places and peoples are suffering more than others
(Beck, 2010b; Bulkeley, 2001; Huang, 2009). Closely linked to the inequity of climate
change impacts are public perceptions of risk that guide norms of responsibility and
accountability associated in responding to these hazards (Harris & Symons, 2010). This
thesis also reviews past studies of public perception of the risks associated with climate
change.
1.1.1 Competing Interests
As a “community of danger” coming together, Beck (2001) believed the United
Nations (UN) could collectively address climate change risks and take more effective
action than individual countries alone. Also critical to Beck’s theorizing of reflexive
modernity is that participation in the UNFCCC is not limited to countries: in recent years,
there has been a dramatic increase in non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
attending and influencing the negotiations (Betsill & Corell, 2001; Betsill & Corell, 2008;
Cabré, 2011; Lund, 2012; Schroeder & Lovell, 2012; Steffek & Nanz, 2008). Among the
most active and influential of these organizations are environmental NGOs – dubbed
ENGOs – and business and industry NGOs (BINGOs) (Betsill & Corell, 2008; Lund,
2012). Each nation and NGO grouping are permitted to submit high-level statements
and opinions on COP decisions and strategies related to climate financing and
adaptation, or other issues of negotiation. This research draws from these statements
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and written opinions presented in 2010 prior to and during the Conference of the Parties
(COP) 16, held in Cancún, Mexico.
The UNFCCC has played a critical role by “catalyzing climate action at various
levels of governance, building an institutional infrastructure, facilitating learning and
enhancing trust among parties, and generally keeping climate change on the
international policy agenda” (Moncel & van Asselt, 2012, p. 163). While Chapter 3
reviews several of the recent cited successes of the UNFCCC – the Cancún
Agreements and Durban Platform for Enhanced Action – this chapter also explores the
UNFCCC’s failure to pass a binding resolution in Copenhagen and the challenges
inherent to climate negotiations as they relate to politics, economy, equity, and process
(Streck, 2012). As Cronin (2002) points out: “The UN is an organization of, by, and for
independent sovereign states, yet it is also a semi independent actor staffed with a semi
autonomous civil service” (p. 54). Borne (2010) says this assessment leads to “two
faces of the UN” – one that involves nations pursuing their own interests, and the other
a single entity searching for multilateral agreement (p. 34). This chapter explores those
competing interests in their construction of risk.
Yet countries are not the only actors with prominent influence at the UNFCCC.
The number of observer organizations – non-governmental groups – has outnumbered
delegates at a majority of COP meetings, and many national delegations also admit
NGO, municipal, or business representatives into their delegations, raising that number
even further (Schroeder & Lovell, 2012). In addition to energizing the negotiations with
side-events, demonstrations, and media attention, NGOs provide much-needed
technical expertise and leadership (Burleson & Wu, 2011; O’Brien, Hayward, & Berkes,
5

2009; Steffek & Nanz, 2008; Tully, 2005). Chapter 3 also reviews the history and
relationship between NGO access and influence in international negotiations, with
particular attention to ENGOs and BINGOs.
While ENGOs, such as the Climate Action Network (CAN), have maintained fairly
consistent framing of the urgency for international action to mitigate and adapt to
climate change, business groups have struggled with conflicting, and sometimes,
incoherent messaging. Tully (2005) notes that companies that stood to lose most, at
least in the short term, such as fossil fuel corporations, have been among the loudest
and most influential in the UNFCCC since its beginning. Yet with the growth of
alternative and lower-emissions energy sectors, these fossil fuel companies no longer
reflect the private sector at negotiations and prevent this constituency from acting as a
cohesive bloc (Tully, 2005). This later section examines these business groups’
changing perceptions of risk as it relates to their economic interests.
1.2

Climate Change Discourse

The articulation or framing of an environmental problem – be it climate change,
pollution, or biodiversity loss – shapes if and how that problem is addressed (Feindt &
Oels, 2005). As such, a discursive perspective allows us to understand how the natural
world is “produced” through environmental policymaking and planning (Feindt & Oels,
2005, p. 163). Utilizing discourse analysis with about 150 UNFCCC documents allowed
me to explore whether the statements and policy positions were about climate change
(its risks and adverse effects) or about the nature of power in response to this threat.
With the computer-assisted data analysis software MAXQDA, I was able to upload my

6

data and apply open coding to pull out themes from the documents. From these codes, I
discovered risk discourse of crisis and survival, while at the same time multiple
instances of framing climate change as an opportunity and a development conflict.
Several discursive themes suggested how these countries and NGOs perceived the
risks of climate change in larger contexts of global development, economic growth, and
social equity, and how these perceptions influenced their discursive responses to
environmental hazards.
1.2.1 Predicted Findings
Prior to coding my dataset, I hypothesized several findings for the three
UNFCCC constituencies based upon my literature review. I predicted that countries, as
the largest constituency, would have the greatest variation of risk discourse, with those
most at risk or already suffering from climate change impacts, such as Small Island
Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), citing the most
frequent discourse of risk and danger associated with environmental change. Based
upon a growing literature of climate security and security culture (Trombetta, 2008), I
hypothesized that many countries would articulate ecological issues as national security
risks to elevate a perception of concern and urgency to respond. I also assumed that a
majority of countries would characterize climate change as a dangerous risk, with the
exception of rapidly emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil, as well as
oil-producing nations belonging to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). Instead, I predicted these countries would attempt to minimize the
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impacts of climate change and scientific evidence for environmental changes in their
high-level statements to maintain their development and economic interests.
Additionally, I hypothesized that unlike the OPEC nations and those with rapidly
emerging economies, the environmental groups would provide the most aggressive
discourse of climate change as dangerous risk in their high-level statements and
submissions to the COP. I anticipated I would find imagery and framing of climate
change as a risk, threat, or struggle in every submission (and was surprised to find that
not the case, as is further described in Chapter 5). In line with Beck’s theorizing of the
rise of subpolitical actors approaching reflexive modernity, I also hypothesized that
these environmental groups would seek to work beyond the international climate regime
and the state for solutions to the climate crisis. I hypothesized that these groups would
clash with business interests, which I predicted would either dispute the validity of
climate change or would downplay its impacts as problems that would or could happen
in the distant future, not the present.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

More than 100 countries have now accepted a 2-degree Celsius limit for globalmean temperature rise to avoid “dangerous climate change” through a combination of
mitigation and adaptation practices (Gosling et al., 2011, p. 444). This non-binding
agreement of the 2009 Copenhagen Accord was heralded as a symbolic step forward,
“albeit a small one towards a global climate change architecture”1 (The Climate Group,
2010, p. 11). But what does avoiding “dangerous climate change” mean, and how do we
characterize the risk that the world faces from rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions?
When the UNFCCC was charged with the “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” it left this concept ambiguous
(United Nations, 1992). Indeed, Risbey (2006) calls the term “dangerous anthropogenic
interference” a “placeholder for the UNFCCC by effectively signaling to the broader
community the notion that climate change can be dangerous at some level” and “policy
measures can be used to try to prevent greenhouse gas concentrations from reaching
dangerous levels” (p. 527).
In 1999, the chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
said it was no longer a question if the Earth’s climate would change, but rather when,
where, and by how much (Watson, 1999). Amidst confusion over the uncertainty of
climate change’s effects also lies misunderstanding of which regions could possibly
1

European Union (EU) member states appeared divided in their interpretations of the outcome of COP
15. This quote comes from German Chancellor Angela Merkel; while the Swedish EU Presidency called
the Copenhagen Accord “a disaster.”
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benefit from warmer temperatures and changing weather patterns and which would
suffer greater fates.
The concept of risk, then, becomes critical to our understanding of “dangerous
climate change” and our framing of what it means for society. Turnheim and Tezcan
(2009) employ the definition of risk offered by the International Risk Governance
Council (IRGC):
Risk is understood as ‘an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with
respect to something that humans value.’ It always refers to a combination of two
things: ‘the likelihood or change of potential consequences and the severity of
consequences of human activities, natural events or a combination of both.’ (p.
518)
Kane and Shogren (2000) contend that risk frameworks acknowledge peoples’
decisions to routinely act and react to risk, generally through an investment of resources
and self-assurance of future wellbeing. Kasperson et al. (1988) differentiate between
the technical concept of risk and risk perceptions as the product of intuitive biases and
cultural values. But how is risk constructed? And how does it affect attitudes toward
climate change?
2.1

Creating a Society of Risk

For Beck (2001), risk is socially constructed and evolves over time. Indeed, Beck
(1997) argued, modern environmental risks are the result of humans’ activity:
Whether we think of the ozone hole or toxins in the air and food, whether we
recall the consequences of genetic engineering or human genetic research, the
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picture is the same everywhere: nature has been changed, designed and
endangered by human activity. One expression of this distinction is that today we
no longer fear nature, but rather what we are inflicting on it. (p. 21)
Beck and Giddens called these self-imposed threats to society “manufactured
uncertainties” – the result of nature becoming more industrialized and concern over
unrealized attempts to control it (Beck, 1997, p. 23). People have always been subject
to risk, but Giddens observed that “modern ‘risk societies’ generate ‘manufactured
risks,’ such as those associated with pollution, new illnesses and crime, which are the
result of the modernization process itself and are marked by a high level of human
agency” (Deere-Birkbeck, 2009, p. 1177). Beck argued these new risks resulted from
our transition from first to second modernity, wherein society initially was centered on
the state and was concerned with controlling industrialization’s relatively predictable
side effects and distribution of “social goods” (Bristow & Fitzgerald, 2011). Yet
industrialization eventually gave rise to a second modernity, focused less on the role of
states and characterized by concern over the distribution of “social bads” resulting from
the unpredictability and uncertainty of a growing number of global risks (Bristow &
Fitzgerald, 2011).
The causes of climate change, then, lie deep within modernity, and they are side
effects of modernization (Bulkeley, 2001). While these risks are produced in modernity,
their unpredictable nature means that they cannot be comprehended or managed within
the modern era’s existing structures (Bulkeley, 2001). Because of this, Beck argued that
a process of reflexivity would arise – a division between traditional state institutions of
accountability and control and a “subpolitical realm,” beyond the political systems of
11

states, which would grow in power and influence (Bulkeley, 2001). This process is
represented in Figure 1 below and described by Bulkeley (2001):
From this morass of evolving ideas, three key points concerning the political
possibilities of contemporary risk emerge: first, that the politics of risk society are
not conducted only, or primarily, through the formal political system; second, that
in light of risk society, the formal political system is weakened; third, that it is
within subpolitics that conflicts of accountability will be resolved or ignored. (p.
434).

Figure 1: Risk society and reflexive modernity, adapted from Bulkeley (2001)

Risk society ultimately refers to a society that has integrated the notion of risk
and organizes itself in response to the perception of such threats (Beck, 1992). Borne
(2010) says such a society is “defined by the distribution of hazards, scientific
ambiguity, and the opening up of governance processes to wider sectors of society” (p.
30). Indeed, Beck has argued that the transnational threat of climate change has
comopolitanized society – creating a new type of community that is not so much formed
12

through face-to-face encounters, but rather though living and struggling with shared
experiences. Pushing for cosmopolitan theory as transformative social theory, Beck,
Blok, Tyfield, and Zhang (2013) suggested that cooperative political action and
community-building are only made possible by the perceived “globality of risk” that
allows opportunities for national and transnational actors to work together in new ways
(p. 6). The UN is one example of this, Beck (2001) argued, because it brings together
“communities of danger” that involve subpolitical actors at all different scales, as well as
countries (p. 47). Citing the growing involvement of NGOs in climate negotiations, Beck
et al. (2013) believed these “grassroots environmentalist communities [would] establish
themselves as agents of cosmopolitization, seeking to hold powerful economic and
political actors accountable to emerging shared norms” (p. 18).
Still, Beck’s optimistic assertions of reflexive modernity’s outcomes have yet to
be proven. Bulkeley (2001) argued that the “prevalence of economic considerations” in
international environmental negotiations suggest that Beck’s conceptualization of risk
society is “too narrow, and that the relations of production [remain] central to the politics
of risk” (p. 439). Rather than Beck’s proposed transition toward cosmopolitanism,
environmental negotiations today remain stymied by “status-quo” political structures and
economic self-interest, despite the growing network of new, legitimate actors at the
table. Such is the view propagated by anti-reflexivists, whom McCright and Dunlap
(2010) characterized as political conservatives attempting to protect the “industrial
capitalist order of simple modernization” by blocking both impact science and
environmental social movements – both traits of reflexive modernization. By
misrepresenting climate research and creating their own anti-environmental think tanks,
13

these anti-reflexive forces have helped suppress scientific results, stall progressive
policymaking, and manipulate media biases in environmental reporting.2
Despite challenges to the empirical validity’s of Beck’s thesis (Mythen, 2007;
Pidgeon & Butler, 2009), his contributions have offered thought-provoking reflections on
the construction of risk in the modern age. Mythen (2007) called Beck’s thesis a “bold
but imperfect master narrative” (p. 807). Indeed, Beck’s greatest contribution may be his
assertion that risk is not isolated from society. As Hulme (2009) rightly stated, climate
change is not only altering the physical world, but the idea of climate change also is
transforming our social worlds. Consequently, material climate change is nothing more
than a change in the physical parameters of the Earth’s atmosphere, Rothe (2011)
concluded. But when we define its ontological status and its perceivable harm to
humans, it is one of the greatest risks of our time.
Consistent with Beck’s theorizing of the relationship between risk and society,
Kasperson et al. (1988) explained the construction of risk through their social
amplification framework “integrating the technical analysis of risk and the cultural,
social, and individual response structures that shape the public perception of risk” (p.
178). As such, risk events – environmental or otherwise – interact with our
psychological and social processes in ways that can either amplify or attenuate public
perception of the risk and related behavior (Ibid.). At the same time that attenuation of
risks allows people to cope with the multitude of risks and events they encounter daily,
“it also may lead to potentially serious adverse consequences from underestimation and

2

See McCright and Dunlap (2010) for further analysis and evidence of anti-environmentalists
misrepresenting and manipulating climate change research results.
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underresponse” (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 178), confounding conventional risk analysis
and assessment.
2.2

The Science of Climate Risk

The role of science remains critical to constructing and responding to climate
change risks. Beck (1992) wrote that “risk consciousness is neither a traditional or lay
person’s consciousness, but is essentially determined by and oriented to science” (p.
72). Yet even Beck warned about a clash of expert knowledge in the face of global risks
that would render science unreliable:
Science has been transformed from a source of security into a source of reflexive
insecurity…Experts can never provide anything but more or less uncertain
knowledge and information on the probabilities of events; they cannot answer the
question as to whether a risk is still acceptable or not. (p. 23)
Since the 1970s, people, particularly in the West, have become progressively
disenchanted with the failure of such expert systems to effectively contain and deflect
these growing risks (Mythen, 2007). Climate science has always acknowledged
complex uncertainty in its predictive models (Oppenheimer, 2005). And until recently,
even the world’s foremost expert body on climate change science, the IPCC, avoided
overt risk-based predictions (Pidgeon & Butler, 2009). As early as 2001, the IPCC
assessments used narrative-based scenarios for describing future uncertainties; while
the 2007 4th Assessment Report (AR4) and 2014 5th Assessment Report (AR5)
summaries provide more explicit probability expressions (“virtually certain,” “extremely
likely,” “very high confidence,” etc.) to explain evidence for a variety of adverse climate
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change impacts. Risk characterization, thus, involves “collecting and summarizing all
relevant evidence necessary for making an informed choice on tolerability or
acceptability of the risk in question and suggesting potential options for dealing with the
risk from a scientific perspective” (Turnheim & Tezcan, 2009, p. 523). Article 4.1 of the
UNFCCC recognizes the role that scientific evidence plays in monitoring, mitigating, and
adapting to climate change, when it tells parties to:
Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and
other research, systematic observation and development of data archives related
to the climate system and intended to further the understanding and to reduce
and eliminate the remaining uncertainties regarding the causes, effects,
magnitude and timing of climate change and the economic and social
consequences of various response strategies. (UN, 1992, Art. 4.1.g)
Within the UNFCCC, the creation of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA) to assist the COP in its agreement brokerage and
decisions drafting further institutionalized the role of science in the international climate
regime (Turnheim & Tezcan, 2009).
2.2.1 Politicizing Risk
At this point, it is worth noting the difference between risk and uncertainty, which
Knight (1921) distinguished as estimates based upon random events that have known
probabilities derived from past occurrences (risk), versus random events with unknown
probabilities that cannot be quantified (uncertainty). Indeed, there is concern among the
scientific community in the inherent uncertainty of climate change modeling (Gosling et
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al., 2011). Adger, Huq, Brown, Conway, and Hulme (2003) argued that “quantifying this
uncertainty has been the subject of the greatest efforts among climate scientists,
teasing out how much is due to our inability to model precisely…and how much is due
to our inability to foresee” (p. 184). Instead, uncertainty has been recast into a growing
field of risk assessment, predominantly defined by experts whom Power (2007)
characterizes as part of a rapidly increasing “risk industry” that converts scientific
uncertainty into measurable and probabilistic risk (Clarke, 1999; Webb, 2011). The
significant uncertainties over the likely distribution and timing of climate change impacts
mean that attempts to frame or set boundaries around what is considered relevant are
ultimately controversial (Webb, 2011). Because of these knowledge gaps, risk is
constructed alongside social values and political priorities of global climate change.
Rather than simply reporting evidence, Webb (2011) argued that risk
assessments might shape our use of knowledge with the potential to mold behavior. If
that is the case, science has “become politicized and drawn into policy formation”
(Eden, 1996, p. 189). As such, risk has become embedded into broader political
rationalities with dueling perceptions on global climate governance (Rothe, 2011).
Hansen (2007) even characterized this politicization as “scientific reticence,” where
scientists would anticipate likely government reactions to evidence of incalculable
climate change risks and manage evidence in ways that would avoid major disruption to
policy agendas or enable easier assimilation into existing bureaucracies (Webb, 2011).
For Kane and Shogren (2000), constructing climate risk is as much about weighing
economic factors as it is about scientific evidence. To this claim, Murphy and Murphy
(2012) cite a trend toward economically attractive framing and solutions of climate
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change, particularly from countries with significant economic dependence on fossil fuel.
That is because they claim “cultural values shape whether scientific findings of risk lead
to concern, denial, or apathy, and hence to changes in practices or their continuation”
(Murphy & Murphy, 2012, p. 248).
One result of politicizing risk is conflicting discourses on the dangers of climate
change. In analyzing 100 newspaper articles in the United States and Germany and 20
speeches given during the UN Summit on Climate Change in New York in 2009 and the
UNFCCC COP 15 in Copenhagen that same year, Rothe (2011) found that “conceptual
vocabulary of the climate discourse is used by actors with different subject positions to
promote different risk storylines for the sake of political argumentation” (p. 335). In other
words, our risk construction of climate change is rather fragmented and
multidimensional. Still, despite this evidence for diverse framings of these threats,
scholars point to an emerging global awareness of the risk of climate change. And many
cite the coming together of transnational parties in the framework of the UNFCCC as a
major institutional step toward dealing with the problem of climate change at a global
level. Indeed, Evans and Steven (2008) claim that the role of scientific institutions, with
rallying support by the IPCC, has institutionalized the connection between climate
scientists and the international community, contributed to aligning high-level
perspectives of the risks and problems of climate change and has helped bring together
governments, civil society, and businesses. The next section examines who has been
included in the framing of these risks and their solutions.
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2.3

Climate Change Inequities

Climate change risks pose a paradox. They are simultaneously democratizing
and hierarchical, said Beck (2010a), who argued like many that “climate change
exacerbates existing inequalities of poor and rich, center and periphery” (p. 175). But
their global nature and growing threat ensures that even the wealthiest and most
powerful will not avoid impacts. Beck called this the “boomerang effect,” wherein
developed countries (whose actions ultimately created such risks) would also
experience damage from changing climate patterns, albeit at a delayed rate compared
with developing countries. That is because the impacts of climate change are not evenly
distributed, often with people exposed to the most immediate and worse of the impacts
also the least able to cope with these risks (Adger et al., 2003; Beck, 2010a; DeereBirkbeck, 2009; Paavola & Adger, 2006; Yamin, 2005).
The IPCC has consistently asserted that the impacts of climate change will
disproportionately fall on developing countries and their poorest, most vulnerable
citizens (Pachauri, 2004; Yamin, 2005). These are nations that typically have low per
capita GHG emissions and consequently minimal responsibility for causing climate
change (Harris & Symons, 2010). As such, the costs of climate change are unfairly
distributed, both among countries and in time (Hale, 2010). Curiously, some have even
suggested that countries might benefit from climate change and ecological crises, which
is further explored in the next chapter. Beck (2010b) offered the example of Russia
because of its large reserves of fossil fuels and warmer temperatures that would allow it
to expand agriculture in Siberia.
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Still, like risk, the concept of vulnerability is socially constructed. Vulnerability is
influenced by institutional and economic dynamics, and the vulnerability of a system to
climate change depends upon its exposure and ability or opportunity to adapt to change
(Adger et al., 2003). Indeed, Beck (2010a) said social vulnerability has become a crucial
element in his analysis of world risk society:
Social processes and conditions produce an unequal exposure to hardly
definable risks, and the resulting inequalities must largely be seen as an
expression and product of power relations in the national and global context. (p.
171)
Ultimately, societal vulnerability to risks associated with climate change may
exacerbate other ongoing social and economic challenges, particularly for those who
remain dependent upon resources that are sensitive to climate change (Adger et al.,
2003; Deere-Birkbeck, 2009). Like a vicious cycle, that vulnerability to climate change is
likely to further reinforce these inequalities on the global stage. In its 2015 listing of
countries at risk from climate change, global risk analytics company Maplecroft ranked
32 of 198 countries assessed at “extreme risk.” This listing, illustrated in Tables 1 and 2,
shows that nearly all of the top 10 countries at extreme risk also are listed among the
UNFCCC’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with the exception of Nigeria and the
Philippines.3

3

Nigeria and the Philippines belong to the Group of 77 (G77) made of about 130 developing countries
generally working together to establish common negotiating positions. While LDCs continue to prioritize
adaptation financing, key G77 countries – Brazil, China and India – are demanding a pledge-and-reviewbased approach. See Evans (2013) for further analysis of these divergent views on financing,
development and the climate regime.
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Table 1: Climate Change Environmental Risk Atlas 2015: Top 10 countries at
extreme risk, adapted from Maplecroft (2014)
Rank

Country

Category

1
2
3
3
5
6

Bangladesh
Sierra Leone
South Sudan
Nigeria
Chad
Haiti

Extreme
Extreme
Extreme
Extreme
Extreme
Extreme

7

Ethiopia

Extreme

8
9
9

Philippines
Central African Republic
Eritrea

Extreme
Extreme
Extreme

Table 2: Least Developed Countries as defined by the UNFCCC

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Country
Afghanistan
Angola
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Burkina Faso
Burundi

8 Cambodia
Central African
9
Republic

Date of
Inclusion
1971
1994
1975
1971
1971
1971
1971

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Country
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal

Date of
Inclusion
1991
1971
1971
1986
1988
1987
1971

1991

32 Niger

1971

1975

33 Rwanda

1971

10 Chad

1971

34

11 Comoros
Dem. Rep of the
12
Congo
13 Djibouti
14 Equatorial Guinea
15 Eritrea

1977

Sao Tome and
Principe
35 Senegal

1991

36 Sierra Leone

1982

1982
1982
1994

37 Solomon Islands
38 Somalia
39 South Sudan

1991
1971
2012

21

1982
2000

16
17
18
19
20

Country
Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti

21 Kiribati
Lao People's
Dem. Republic
23 Lesotho
22

24 Liberia

Date of
Inclusion
1971
1975
1971
1981
1971

40
41
42
43
44

Country
Sudan
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tuvalu
Uganda
United Rep. of
Tanzania

Date of
Inclusion
1971
2003
1982
1986
1971

1986

45

1971

1971

46 Vanuatu

1985

1971

47 Yemen

1971

1990

48 Zambia

1991

2.3.1 Climate Justice
A growing literature of climate justice explores the inequities caused by
environmental risks, often positioning this dialogue between the countries of the global
North and South. Huang (2009) rightly stated that despite growing awareness for action
on climate change, there is substantial divergence between the developed North and
developing South on how to approach these risks. These differences are not simply
varying perspectives, but rather result from substantial conflicts of interest between the
North and South in matters of socioeconomic development (Huang, 2009). Simply put,
fast-developing countries of the South do not intend to hinder their efforts toward
industrialization or modernization despite a rise in GHG emissions. Neither China nor
India, as example, will agree to an international approach that constrains their economic
development (Beck, 2010b). Huang (2009) added that these countries also assert a
need for the North to shoulder the major responsibility in mitigating climate change
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because of their “lion’s share in energy consumption” and emissions from their own
industrialization (p. 435). Beck (2010a) further explained this dichotomy:
The 900 million people privileged by the grace of birth in the west are responsible
for 86 per cent of world consumption; they use 58 per cent of its energy supplies
and have 79 per cent of world income at their disposal as well as 74 per cent of
all telephone connections. The poorest 1.2 billion, one-fifth of the world’s
population are responsible for 1.3 per cent of world consumption, use 4 percent
of its energy supplies and have 1.5 per cent of all telephone connections. (p.
167)
Ultimately, this disproportionality raises profound questions of fairness and
responsibility. Do these major GHG emitters of the North have a special obligation to
assist the developing South both in adapting to climate change and meeting their
socioeconomic needs? Paavola and Adger (2006) framed these justice dilemmas in
three questions: 1) What is the responsibility of developed countries for climate change
impacts; 2) How much should developed countries give assistance to developing
countries for adapting to climate change; and 3) How should the burden be distributed
among developed countries? Deep divisions in the UNFCCC still exist over the extent to
which developed countries should assist developing countries to adapt (Paavola &
Adger, 2006). One argument against assistance claims responsibility cannot be
established because climate change impacts cannot be traced to the specific actions or
actors who caused them (Paavola & Adger, 2006). Yet, a recently released historical
emissions study found that just 90 companies (fossil fuel and cement producers) have
produced almost two-thirds of the GHG emissions since the industrial age began
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(Heede, 2014). The study also noted that while current climate change is driven by
historical emissions, “the parties responsible for the dominant sources of historical
emissions are not necessarily the same as those responsible for the dominant share of
current emissions” (Heede, 2014, p. 229). What role, then, should historical emissions
play in contemporary discussions of climate change assistance? The UNFCCC does
not overlook questions of responsibility and states that the impacts of climate change
will be felt unevenly among countries. Its text refers to “common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capacities” (UN, 1992, Art. 3.1). It also acknowledges the
need to take into account “differences in these Parties’ [Annex 1] starting points and
approaches, economic structures and resources bases” (UN, 1992, Art. 4.2c). Still,
crucial gaps remain, as the regime does not determine how much assistance should be
made to developing countries and how the North should share the burden of assistance,
and who should be held accountable for emissions over what timeframe (Paavola &
Adger, 2006; Heede, 2014).
Among the most-cited vulnerable nations in international environmental
negotiations are the small island states, which often suffer a combination of
geographical, social and economic inequities related to climate change. Specifically the
countries of Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, the Maldives, and Kiribati have caught the
attention of the IPCC, which characterizes their unique vulnerability to climate change
due to small physical size, limited natural resources, relative isolation, proneness to
natural disasters, and poorly developed infrastructure (Cameron, 2011). Yet Adger,
Barnett, Chapin, and Ellemor (2011) also noted the potential negative cultural and
nonmaterial impacts of climate change that are not as easily summarized in economic
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terms. While metrics have been developed to assess the market costs, human lives
lost, distributional affects, changes to quality of life, and people displaced, they do not
address what level of loss is acceptable or fair (Adger et al., 2011). And they do not take
into account the value of traditional ecological knowledge, for which many of these
communities have utilized to adapt to their changing environments. The climate change
risks and framing specific to small island states will be examined in later chapters.
Ultimately, these communities represent the major climate justice concerns in the fight
against climate change on the international stage.
2.4

Public Risk Perceptions

It is no surprise that public support or opposition to climate policies are greatly
influenced by public perceptions of risk and the dangers of global climate change
(Leiserowitz, 2006). As example, Slovic (2000) cited research that found peoples’
perceptions are influenced not only by scientific and technical descriptions of danger,
but also by a number of social and psychological factors, including affect and emotion,
trust, values, world views, and personal experiences – dimensions of risk perception
that rarely are explored in public opinion polls. Yet, Thompson and Rayner (2000) have
argued that these public perceptions must be included in the assessment of risks. Most
theorists have assumed that decision-making about risk is essentially a cognitive activity
(Leiserowitz, 2006) – but not one that generally can be swayed simply by providing
more detailed and accurate information to correct misconceptions or alleviate fears
(O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999). Kempton, Boster, and Hartley (1995) discovered that
Americans had already assimilated information on climate change into pre-existing
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mental models of stratospheric ozone depletion and the ozone hole. As such, they
mistakenly believed that banning aerosol spray cans could solve climate change. Wood
and Vedlitz (2007) asserted that individuals generally lack the time, cognitive skill and
resources to correctly interpret information, and thus engage in what Herbert Simon
called “satisficing,” or processing information through a filter of past assessments and
ideology. The result is often misconstrued and contradictory perceptions of climate
change risks and policies. For example, Leiserowitz’s found that “Americans expressed
moderate levels of concern about [climate change]” and “strongly supported national
regulation of carbon dioxide as a pollutant,” while at the same time opposing increases
in energy business and gasoline taxes (2006, p. 56). Leiserowitz’s findings differ from
Slovic’s earlier research employing a psychometric paradigm; he found that people
tended to view current risk levels as unacceptably high for most activities (Slovic, 1987).
From this, he noted that “the gap between perceived and desired risk levels suggests
that people are not satisfied with the way that market and other regulatory mechanisms
have balanced risks and benefits” (Slovic, 1987, p. 283).
To that end, O’Connor et al. (1999) cited the complexities among peoples’ risk
perceptions of climate change. They are neither “‘nonbelievers’ who will take no
initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they ‘believers’ who
promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that
promises to address climate change” (p. 461). Most people relate to climate change
through their personal experiences, while failing to take larger public values and global
views into consideration. This cognitive balance between short- and long-term needs is
problematic for risk communication, said Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006), whose
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research on public views of climate change in the United States and Europe concluded
climate change was of secondary concern to peoples’ everyday lives. For those whom
climate change is not an immediate concern, Nisbet (2009) offered issue framing as
shortcuts for defining the risks of climate change. Several of those frames are detailed
in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Typology of climate change frames, adapted from Nisbet (2009)
Frame
Scientific and technical
uncertainty
Morality and ethics
Economic development and
opportunity
Pandora's box/Frankenstein's
monster
A battle to overcome

Social progress

Defines climate change issues as…
A debate over what is known versus
unknown; a matter of expert understanding or
consensus versus hype or alarmism
A matter of right and wrong; respect or
disrespect for thresholds, limits or boundaries
An economic investment; market benefit or
risk; a point of local, national or global
competitiveness
A need for precaution or action in face of
possible catastrophe or out-of-control
consequences; fatalism with no way to avoid
the chosen path
A struggle or fight that must be won; combat
against an enemy
A means of improving quality of life;
alternative interpretation as a way of being in
harmony with nature as opposed to mastering
it

Nisbet (2009) argued that this framing strategy was critical in creating public perception
and understanding of the climate change problem, and in framing our responses to it.
Further discussion of climate change framing is addressed in later sections on
discourse and this thesis’ methodology.
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CHAPTER 3

BACKGROUND

Since 1992, the UNFCCC has played a vital role in addressing climate change.
Hilde (2012) credits the UNFCCC with successfully promoting global awareness of the
issues, generating normative obligations toward tackling these ecological risks and
acting as a clearing house for research and information, as well as an intermediary for
large-scale financing. Negotiating solutions to climate change arguably are the most
complicated challenges our international community faces today; and while the
UNFCCC sets direction and defines many of the tools and mechanisms needed, “it
does not provide any clear strategy on how to solve the climate crisis” (Streck, 2012, p.
52). Its three pillars – shared vision, accountability in action, and assisting developing
countries in combating climate change – have produced numerous commitments toward
financing and emissions reduction (Streck, 2012), many of which are outlined below in
Table 4, which is based upon the UNFCCC’s own listed accomplishments. Even so, the
UNFCCC has yet to achieve a comprehensive, binding solution. Still, this transnational
climate regime does offer an international political, economic, and social network from
which to examine global risk perceptions among key constituencies. And, it offers an
arena in which to test Beck’s theory of risk society and the rise of reflexive modernity to
address these new global hazards, such as climate change.
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Table 4: Major UNFCCC agreements from 2007-2011
Key Steps

COP
Year

Bali Action
Plan

2007

Copenhagen
Accord

2009

Cancun
Agreements

2010

Durban
Outcomes

2011

Significant Actions
Divided into five main categories: shared vision,
mitigation, adaptation, technology, and financing.
Refers to a long-term vision for action on climate
change, including a long-term goal for emission
reductions.
Endorses the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and
recognizes the increase in global temperature should
be below 2-degrees Celsius. Agrees that developing
countries should slow growth in emissions through
mitigation actions. Establishes a Green Climate Fund
to support developing countries' mitigation. Encourages
countries to set emission reduction targets.
Establishes clear goals and schedule for reducing
human-generated GHG emissions to keep global
average temperature rise below 2-degrees Celsius.
Mobilizes the development and transfer of clean
technology to boost efforts address climate change.
Set up the Green Climate Fund to provide support to
developing countries to assist them in mitigation and
adaptation plans.
Establishes a second commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol, where developed countries commit to GHG
cuts and accounting rules. Launches a new platform of
negotiations under the Convention to deliver a new and
universal GHG reduction protocol with legal force by
2015 for the period beyond 2020.

While this thesis does not seek to analyze the legitimacy and governance of the
UNFCCC, it is worth noting criticisms of its effectiveness and ability to adequately tackle
such issues of international importance. To that end, Huang (2009) stated:
Its mammoth size and lack of strong leadership has substantially constrained its
effectiveness, making it virtually toothless in terms of implementation as well as
decisionmaking. Despite marathon programs, most of the meetings of the
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COP…appeared more symbolic than substantial, and the agreements achieved
through exhausting negotiations are hardly abiding. (p. 438)
While such criticism is certainly debatable, there is no denying that the UNFCCC has
yet to meet the goal it set for itself – no matter how insurmountable it may seem at
times. The UNFCCC’s primary agents are the countries that negotiate each year toward
mitigation and adaptation plans for the impacts of climate change. These parties – as
they are called – are responsible for taking the appropriate actions and measures
related to their commitments (Turnheim & Tezcan, 2010). Article 4 of the Convention
states that each of the Annex I parties (industrialized countries and those with
economies in transition4) should “coordinate as appropriate with such other Parties,
relevant economic and administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of
the Convention” and shall “identify and periodically review its own policies and
practices” (UN, 1992, art. 4.2.e). As such, parties are self- and peer-reviewed with
respect to their actions and given the freedom to achieve a common goal (Turnheim &
Tezcan, 2010). Within this arena, Beck argued that the risks associated with climate
change should pave the way toward more cosmopolitan world politics. While it certainly
has drawn countries together on an international stage, there also is great evidence that
we are still very far apart.
Borne (2010) suggested that is because the UN has two faces: “one as a
collection of the world’s nations pursuing their own narrow interests within a multilateral
environment, and the other an entity in its own right” (p. 34). Together, these competing
4

The UNFCCC defines Annex I countries as industrialized countries that were members of the OECD
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in
transition, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States and several Central and Eastern European
States.
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forces make up a dynamic body – almost like a living system – “permeated by a myriad
of flows that converge internally and are subsequently radiated outwards again towards
wider society” (Borne, 2010, p. 34). As such, Strong (2003) viewed the UN as an arena
of ideologies and values and forum for discussion and negotiations, rather than a “place
of operations” (p. 117). Still, it is a forum with “two-level norms,” said Hilde (2012), who
found that parties to the UNFCCC shared “basic norms regarding climate change,” but
would still revert to national self-interest at the negotiating table (p. 894). To explain this,
Hilde drew from Robert Putnam’s theory of “two-level games” – where countries
negotiating on the international stage also are negotiating within their own borders with
domestic governing bodies and economic interests. The result often produces great
tension among parties, whose leaders superficially agree upon general norms of the
Convention, but differ when negotiations are incompatible with a country’s
domestication of those norms. Depledge (2005) stated this more clearly when observing
strong tendency for competition over cooperation among negotiating parties:
This is partly the result of the high political stakes of climate change, including
concerns over national economic interests and competitiveness, as well as the
long time horizon of the problem, which has led to a focus on short-term costs
rather than on the benefits that would accrue in the future. The tendency to
competitiveness is also a product of the North-South divide to the negotiations
where the imperative of global cooperation struggles against a history of mistrust
and differing perceptions of the problem. (p. 32)
Figure 2 below illustrates the various UNFCCC party groupings in which
countries tend to organize themselves in the international climate regime, generally due
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to similar negotiating positions toward climate change and common socioeconomic
conditions. Yet Evans (2013) noted these groupings may have further diverged in recent
years, particularly among the emerging economies of the Group of 77 and the LDCs of
the global South, with new political and economic leaders such as China, Brazil, and
India shaping their own domestic and development policies.

Figure 2: Illustration of UNFCCC country groupings, adapted from Depledge
(2005)

Much also has been written about the neoliberal bias of UNFCCC negotiations,
whose contemporary risk approaches tend to align more closely with political norms and
rationalities of affluent Western democracies than those of other nations (Pidgeon &
Butler, 2009). From the sheer numbers of parties and structure of these groups outlined
in Figure 2, this should come as no surprise. Yet, it will be further examined during this
paper’s analysis of risk discourses in the selected UNFCCC documents in the following
chapters.
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3.1

Non-State Actors on the International Stage

Countries are not the only actors involved in these international negotiations. In
recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of non-state actors
attending the COP – added to the near-universal participation of countries (Schroeder &
Lovell, 2012). Nearly 1,400 non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs) had observer status under the UNFCCC at COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009
(Schroeder & Lovell, 2012). Today, the number of NGOs admitted to the UNFCCC is
just under 1,600 – with another 100 IGOs – as observer organizations. The number of
observers has almost always outnumbered party delegates at COP meetings, as
illustrated in Figure 3, and many national parties also admit representatives from NGOs,
cities, and businesses into their delegations, increasing their numbers even further.
From 1995 to 2004, about 25 percent of national delegations at the COP incorporated
NGO activists (Kruse, 2012).
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
COP 13

COP 14
Parties/Observer States

COP 15

COP 16

Observers

Figure 3: Numbers of parties and observers attending COP, 2007-2010 (UNFCCC,
2015)
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As such, Betsill and Corell (2008) noted that the UNFCCC involves a “myriad [of]
actors representing a diversity of interests” – akin to an environmental mega-conference
(p. 2). Within the official delegation process, NGOs are allowed to participate by
observing the negotiations, accessing official documents, addressing party delegation
leaders during plenary sessions, and distributing information and material to negotiators
(Depledge, 2005). To date, it has been difficult to assess the influence that NGOs have
on the international negotiations. Betsill and Corell (2001) have characterized their
activities as “indirect strategies” – “developing and using informal relationships with
state delegates, lurking in the corridors” and “even searching trash cans and copy
machines in hopes of retrieving documents being worked on behind closed doors” (p.
70).
In spite of these less-than-glorious activities, the rise of these non-state actors
arguably follows Beck’s thesis on world risk society and a kind of cosmopolitan
disturbance of existing political order. Beck et al. (2013) described it as such:
The order of the nation-state(s) is being disturbed, undermined and redefined,
reimagined by the intervention and incorporation of human rights, NGOs, climate
experts…With climate change, the nationally excluded ‘Other’ is in our midst; and
national resources and jurisdictions have no answers to the cosmopolitan
challenges that it raises. (p. 5)
Of the UNFCCC’s nine recognized non-state constituencies, outlined in Table 5,
this paper focuses the bulk of its analysis on the two largest UNFCCC civil society
constituencies, ENGOs and BINGOs, while recognizing that many of the other
constituencies – indigenous peoples groups (IPOs), farmers, women and gender and
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youth (deemed YOUNGO by the UNFCCC) – also identify with environmental interests,
and even the developing South. For the purposes of this thesis, groups from the
Women and Gender, IPO, YOUNGO and Farmers’ constituencies, whose statements
and submissions closely align (and even were co-submitted) with ENGOs, also will be
included in the dataset of ENGO documents described in Chapter 4. A complete
breakdown of these non-state groups is illustrated in Figure 4, with ENGOs and then
BINGOs making up the largest non-state constituencies.

Table 5: UNFCCC non-state constituencies (UNFCCC, 2015)
Name

Constituency Group

Year Formalized

BINGO
ENGO

Business and Industry
Environmental
Local Government and
Municipal Authorities
Indigenous Peoples
Research and Independent
Trade Union
Farmers and Agricultural
Women and Gender
Youth

Pre-1994
Pre-1994

LGMA
IPO
RINGO
TUNGO
Farmers
Women and Gender
YOUNGO
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1995
2001
2003
2008
2014
2009
2009

BINGO
11%

ENGO
15%

Farmers
IPO
LGMA

26%

RINGO
40%

TUNGO
Women and Gender
YOUNGO
Non-affiliated

Figure 4: Illustration of NGO participant percentages, 2013 (UNFCCC, 2015)

In its statement about UNFCCC participation, YOUNGO says, “As youths, the
future is ours. Yet, actions today jeopardize the very world we will have [to] live in,”
according to the constituency’s website, YouthClimate.org. Such vulnerable groups –
youths, women and indigenous peoples – have long been marginalized and often
excluded from making decisions on the public management of climate risks (Adger,
2003). Through participation in the Convention, those most vulnerable have gained a
voice and formal ability to hold governments accountable for their stated positions and
resulting actions (Cameron, 2011; Deere-Birkbeck, 2009), embodying Beck’s theorizing
of the rise of subpolitical actors influencing the state and status-quo institutions. In
particular, scholars have paid special attention to small island states and the growing
number of environmental NGOs supporting their efforts to generate awareness and
mitigate or adapt to climate change. While environmental groups from industrialized
countries often use small island nations as the “poster child” for the climate change
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crisis, their efforts can sometimes be at odds with the nation’s government, or even its
people. Cameron (2011) has labeled these competing metadiscourses in the
governance of these islands – as civic environmentalism is aimed at “saving” the islands
and their inhabitants, these groups are competing with localized neoliberal
governmentalities also negotiating at the global scale. Farbotko and Lazrus (2012) also
have criticized the incongruences of international ENGOs and small island states, even
if their goals overlap. At question is Western groups’ framing of small island peoples as
victim-commodities of climate change while pursuing environmental activities concerned
with combatting the climate crisis (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). Yet these are not the only
NGO interests whose actions are at odds.
3.2

Business Interests in Environmental Negotiations

Civil society at the UNFCCC represents organizations of every size – from the
grassroots peoples’ movements of the global South to the world’s largest corporations.
This section explores the evolving relationship that business organizations have had
with the Convention. Despite their grouping in one of the larger NGO constituency –
BINGOs – these industries do not present an entirely unified front, with subgroupings of
agricultural, alternative energy, and fossil fuel interests seeking diverse solutions to the
climate crisis (Fernandes & Girard, 2011). Not surprisingly, the private sector is a
leading player in plans proposed in the international climate regime, largely driven by
market mechanisms and economic interests. For Hale (2010), the growing power of
transnational businesses and their ability to lay constraints on the actions of national
governments, are features of our global economy. Business interests propagate a
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dominating discourse, Lund (2012) argued, “which assumes the compatibility of
economic growth and environmental protection” (p. 5).
While BINGOs’ participation in the negotiations has been more turbulent than
their ENGO counterparts (Tully, 2005), their structural advantages seem to have
resulted in larger influence (Lund, 2012). For one, Tully (2005) argued that national or
trade-specific industry groups have enjoyed close working relationships with state
delegations. Not only valued for their technical knowledge to help shape what is
technologically and economically feasible, BINGOs possess structural power over
policymakers considering what broad economic impacts their proposals would have
(Falkner, 2010). Because economic interests primarily drive governments, Orsini (2012)
argued, business organizations can affect significant influence in negotiation outcomes.
That same influence could be asserted over these groups’ shaping of climate change
risk and discourse:
By portraying the issue from a certain angle, highlighting some aspects, and
shadowing others, industry actors attempt to influence how the society perceives
the issue and how the political authorities respond to it. (Schlichting, 2013, p.
294)
Figure 5 illustrates the numerous channels of influence BINGOs employ at the
UNFCCC. Direct lobbying has been cited as one of the most successful tactics – with
one of the more active lobbyists inside the UN, the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development, representing 200 of the biggest global companies whose
combined worth is $7 trillion annually (Fernandes & Girard, 2011). Another organization,
the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), a now-defunct industry group of fossil fuel interests,
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advised the Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti and Russian governments to obstruct political
deliberations and weaken the language of scientific reports (Tully, 2005). Business and
corporate interests, consequently, have made an effort to build hegemonic coalitions of
actors (countries and NGOs) with the ability to establish norms that can structure the
regime in particular ways (Levy, 2005). This Gramscian approach illustrates how
international environmental agreements are negotiated: “even the most powerful states
[or groups] are generally unable to impose a particular agreement on the international
community, though the may be able to block or delay for some time” (Levy, 2005, p. 75).

Figure 5: BINGO channels of influence, adapted from Fernandes and Girard, 2011
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Known for its outspoken and controversial stance on climate change, the GCC
no longer represents international business interests at the UNFCCC. And some
leading oil firms publically (at least) have taken a more conciliatory stance from when
the UNFCCC was first established. Falkner (2010) cited British Petroleum’s American
subsidiary’s withdrawal from the GCC in 1996, signaling a rift within the fossil fuel
sector. Since then, Tully (2005) has cited the growing inconsistency of business
messages about climate change risks:
The companies that stand to lose the most – at least in the short term – have
from the beginning been the most prominent and influential business voices in
the climate negotiations…However, the fossil fuel sector is unrepresentative of
the private sector generally…Since the business community is not homogeneous
it may be unable to marshal coherent or uniform recommendations. (pp. 23-24)
Similarly, Schlichting (2013) found in her longitudinal study of industrial climate
change communication that corporations’ strategic framing of the environment has
greatly changed from 1990 to 2010. Indeed, international business interests have
shifted from questioning the science of climate change to portraying themselves as
industrial leaders, thus influencing international dialogue:
The automobile industry, for example, [now] promotes carbon-free electric
vehicles… and conventional energy corporations cast themselves as ‘Green
Energy Generator of the Year.’ (Schlichting, 2013, p. 494)
Levy (2005) attributed this shift in perspectives to “changing competitive
dynamics, the evolution of new organizations supportive of a proactive industry role,
and the diffusion of ‘win-win’ discourse articulating the consonance of environmental
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and business interests” (p. 74). Still, BINGOs today do represent a constituency of
stakeholders with widely diverging views on climate change – from so-called “gray”
businesses that oppose GHG emissions regulations to “green” businesses, which see
climate mitigation and adaptation as an opportunity (de Sépibus, 2012). Indeed, a global
business coalition launched in 2007, Caring for Climate, includes in its leadership
platform the serious risks of damage from climate change and the opportunity for
businesses of all sizes to take an active and leading role in developing and deploying
low-carbon technologies (Fernandes & Girard, 2011). Akin to theories of ecological
modernization, climate change is more often framed as an opportunity in recent years –
one that also aligns with dominant norms of sustainable development. A 2008 study
from the Carbon Trust reported that “tackling climate change could create opportunities
for a company to increase its value up to 80% if it is well positioned and proactive” (p.
3). Conversely, companies whose strategies remain “business-as-usual” could threaten
up to 65 percent of their value (p. 5). The BINGOs that submitted statements to the
UNFCCC in 2010 will be examined in Chapter 4 for similar perceptions.
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CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY & DATA

International negotiations and institutions such as the UNFCCC have provided an
arena in which countries and subpolitical organizations have “inter-subjectively come to
some understandings about what norms concerning global warming mean” (Paterson,
1996, p. 129). Through these processes – this creation of norms – the risks of climate
change also have been constructed and contested, with each party bringing its own
perspective to the proverbial table. This chapter explores research on environmental
discourse and the analytical approaches that help examine the documents that make up
the scope of this thesis. As such, critical environmental discourse theories and thinkers
will be reviewed, along with recent technologies that assist in qualitative data analysis of
this kind.
Environmental discourse involves numerous sub-topics, such as toxic
substances, biodiversity, air quality and climate change, and encompasses diverse
ways of talking and thinking about the environment (Feindt & Oels, 2005). Indeed,
Dryzek (2005) points to four dominant modern environmental discourses covering these
issues in his seminal work, “The Politics of the Earth”: survivalism, sustainability,
environmental problem-solving, and green radicalism. These discourses, Dryzek (2005)
said, offer a “shared way of apprehending the world…[they] construct meanings and
relationships, helping to define common sense and legitimate knowledge” (p. 9). More
importantly, though, they provide the framing and articulation of a problem that shapes if
and how it is handled (Feindt & Oels, 2005). Consequently, a discursive approach
allows us to understand how the natural world is “produced” through environmental
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policymaking and planning (Feindt & Oels, 2005, p. 163). Environmental discourse
certainly has shifted over the years with the concept of risk becoming more prominent
during the 1980s and especially after the Chernobyl and Bhopal incidents (Feindt &
Oels, 2005). In his own environmental discourse analysis, Rothe (2011) found
competing storylines of climate change risk while studying UNFCCC documents and
related reports that shifted from 2007 to 2009. The concept of “climate change as war”
was much more prominent in later years, Rothe reported, with “numerous expressions
in the material that depict climate change as an enemy or an attack, as a criminal
offender or as a threat” (2011, p. 337). These perspectives were then adopted by
“discourse coalitions,” whose acceptance and propagation of such storylines further
fueled its use.
4.1

Discursive Approach

While researchers have used many different notions of discourse, sometimes
with competing definitions, this thesis defines discourse not simply as a “communicative
exchange, but a complex entity that extends into the realms of ideology, strategy,
language, and practice, and is shaped by the relations between power and knowledge”
(Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p. 195). By extension, policy discourse on environmental
issues such as climate change could be thought of as “the bundle of exchanges that
give shape through metaphors and practices to a particular policy-making process or
debate” (Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p. 195). These discourses, then, have an existence
beyond the text and reflect the perceptions, power relations and intentions of the
various actors. Stated broadly, discourse analysis relates texts to social practices found
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within particular discourses, which could include institutions, norms, knowledge
systems, social practice, and language (Livesey, 2002).
The discursive approach applied in this thesis draws upon the discoursetheoretical perspectives of Foucault and Hajer, whose work highlights how “language
has the capacity to make politics, to create signs and symbols that shift power balances,
to render events harmless or, on the contrary, to create political conflict” (Hajer &
Versteeg, 2005, p. 179). This thesis heavily aligns its methodology and analysis with
Foucault’s view that “different systems of meaning or discourses compete for influence
in society and, consequently, that structural changes in society can be conceptualized
as shifts in the relative influence of different discourses” (Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p.
196). In this sense, “meaning-making is an inherently political process,” in which the first
step is framing an issue so that it can be addressed by political policy-making (Waitt,
Farbotko, & Criddle, 2012, p. 37). Like Foucault, Hajer assumed language was not a
“neutral messenger of given interests and preferences,” but rather it influenced their
formation (Feindt & Oels, 2005, p. 166). But Hajer differs from Foucault in his emphasis
on actor coalitions. In his discursive approach, actors position themselves in the realm
of a given discourse and try to shape it (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). Akin to Hajer, Carolan
and Bell (2003) believed that the knowledge we attach to ourselves also locates us
discursively in a specific network or coalition. Ultimately, they argue:
We build coalitions; we engage in collective action; we speak up, together, in a
loud voice. And if we are loud enough and cogent enough, the result is…a
discursive movement where the existing social relations of knowledge become
contested, resulting in the possibility of new social relations of truth, and thus
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new social relations of trust. How these ‘moments’ are handled and resolved can
therefore lead to new patters of power/knowledge/identity. (Carolan & Bell, 2003,
p. 232)
The UNFCCC, its constituencies, and debates over climate change provide an ideal
platform to test such theories, specifically as it relates to the construction of risk.
4.1.1 Potential Research Bias
Before further exploring climate change discourse and this thesis’ methodology
and data, it is important to detail potential research bias in this work – and those efforts
to eliminate it. Sharp and Richardson (2001) noted that the process of selecting the
discourses that are to be the framework for any research project are subjective and
reflect the researcher’s interests and preoccupations. Cheek (2008) also observed that
researchers of are in a position to impose meanings on another’s text, and their
research itself can be another product of discourse.
In 2010, I was selected as one of about 20 delegates to attend the UNFCCC
COP 16 negotiations in Cancún, Mexico, with the U.S.-based sustainable development
youth NGO SustainUS. During that time, I volunteered as the NGO’s media and
communications coordinator and worked with more than a dozen NGO communications
colleagues in the months leading up to, during and after COP 16. In this role, I assisted
in writing statements and press releases related to youth-issues and perspectives on
climate change and the negotiations.
I came into this research with respect for the critical role that discourse and
framing can have on shaping risk perceptions of environmental issues. Working with my
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YOUNGO and ENGO colleagues during this time, especially those who wrote opinions
and briefs submitted to the UNFCCC prior to the COP, provided insight into the complex
decision-making process of how to present the risks of climate change to the
international community. To aid in eliminating potential bias, I did not include in my
dataset any documents that I could have been involved in creating. This led me to
select only high-level statements and opinions that were written and presented to the
COP, as opposed to position papers and supplemental materials distributed during the
negotiations. I did not play a role in any of the YOUNGO or Youth Climate submissions
that are part of my data for this research. Additionally, I elected to rely solely on written
submissions, as opposed to interviews with constituency or party leaders – several of
whom from the YOUNGO and ENGO constituencies I have developed professional
relationships and friendships with since COP 16.
Just as my experiences have helped shape my personal views on international
environmental negotiations, they also have helped to inform my academic
understanding of the UNFCCC, its role and impact on the global stage. As someone
who helped to shape communication about climate change for youth, I have witnessed
first-hand how discourse is closely embedded with power and ideology and its use in
international regimes, such as the UNFCCC.
4.1.2 Limitations of the Study
Like all research, this thesis has certain limitations in both its study and
application of risk perception of climate change at international environmental
negotiations. For one, the dataset is limited to only high-level statements and opinions
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submitted to the UNFCCC for COP 16, as described in the following section. Indeed,
many other texts and narratives are typically available during COPs, including but not
limited to media coverage; position papers authored by countries’ delegations and
NGOs or other observers; internal memorandums and newsletters produced by the
UNFCCC Secretariat’s office; and the negotiating texts themselves. Resource and time
constraints, coupled with the decision detailed above to not include position papers and
verbal interviews with stakeholders, have limited my dataset in this thesis.
Additionally, this thesis takes a discursive approach to examine documents
affiliated with a single COP during a fixed time period. A more comprehensive study of
risk perceptions and evolving responses to climate change would include a time-series
study, analyzing discourse and climate change framing over a set number of years and
relating it to negotiated outcomes of climate governance on the international stage.
Such a study would ultimately provide us with a more complete understanding of how
we perceive and respond to ecological risk.
4.2

Data Selection & Analysis

Within the above-stated framework of discourse analysis, texts were sourced
from the UNFCCC website (http://unfccc.int), which provides a database of documents
for the Convention, all of its subsidiary bodies and ad hoc working groups. Within this
portal is the ability to pull submissions from parties (countries) and observer
organizations (NGOs) for each COP. All of the party and observer organization
submissions for COP 16 were downloaded and characterized as one of the three
constituencies for this research project – countries, ENGOs (to include YOUNGO,
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indigenous, farmers and women’s groups) or BINGOs. To be included in the sample,
the document had to be primarily written in English (at least 85 percent of content) –
one of six official UN languages. About a dozen countries’ submissions were not
included in this study because they were in Spanish; another dozen were in French; and
another half dozen were in Arabic.
The resulting sample of documents for this research (described in Appendix A)
included either high-level statements – those verbally delivered to the COP plenary from
the submitted script – or written submissions for consideration on specific UNFCCC
negotiating issues, such as the clean development mechanism, standardized GHG
emissions baselines, or adaptation funds. In total, this included high-level statements
and submissions from 110 countries, 22 ENGOs and 13 BINGOs. Countries were also
marked according to their UNFCCC party groupings, such as G-77, Annex I, OPEC,
SIDS, and LDCs, as these groupings typically are used to present substantive interests
of the parties in climate negotiations. Together, these documents represent a range of
perspectives on climate change, its impacts, and necessary actions.
4.2.1 Data Analysis & Coding
Once the data sample was collected, I employed a computer-assisted method to
extract the most important topics of this discourse. Rather than using a frequency and
proximity analysis of key words and text population to explore discursive themes, I
employed an open coding process (akin to Charmaz’s (2014) grounded theory
approach) to identify categorizations, actions, and naming as related to climate change
and environmental risk. This coding process allowed me to examine not only words
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associated with constituencies’ risk perceptions of climate change but also to assess
the language in the context of each document, providing further insight into political and
structural forces, as well as cultural and social values. These code classifications
(described in Appendix B) in the sample documents were marked within the MAXQDA
software platform, which helped me quantify and analyze the codes, as discussed in the
following chapter. While I developed the various code classifications from the reading of
each text, they were informed and reinforced by the literature review related to climate
change discourse. Only when the open coding process was complete, did I calculate
word frequencies from my key discursive themes for each constituency dataset.
Stemming from my research question of how these three UNFCCC
constituencies perceive risk, I paid particular attention to how each actor and/or coalition
characterized climate change. From open coding, these categorizations took on several
sub-codes, including characterizations of climate change as a dangerous and imminent
threat, a battle or fight and a challenge that could be “tackled” or “solved,” in addition to
spatial imagery depicting either urgency or future concern. Rothe (2011) found similar
themes in his analysis of documents (speeches and news articles) that discursively
framed climate change as risk, with a focus on the future:
Climate change in most depictions is not an actual threat but one that lies in the
future. This is expressed by spatial and motional metaphors. The climate threat
thus lies in front of us; we are quickly moving toward it. In this respect the Earth
is sometimes described as a vehicle driven by humanity. Politicians in this
narrative have the obligation to steer the vehicle safety so as to avoid the
catastrophic threat. (p. 338)
49

The underlying assumption is that responding to climate change is a choice (and
the “right one” can still be made), embodied by norms of responsibility and optimism
that the climate crisis can be overcome. Closely related is imagery of climate change as
a battle or a war that can be won through the utilization of new technologies and
international collaboration. In his research, Rothe (2011) described this as “the
metaphorical concept of climate change being a race or contest between the heating
Earth and humanity or single nation states” (p. 338). Semantically, the UNFCCC seeks
to qualify the degree of human interaction with the climate system that is dangerous,
while these types of narratives and metaphors attach labels of risk and threat to climate
change itself (Methmann & Rothe, 2012). Consequently, the initial human activities that
have caused climate change are concealed through imagery and framing of climate
change as dangerous; whereas “climate change mutates from a process rooted in
human activity to a dangerous Other” that must be destroyed (Methmann & Rothe,
2012, p. 328). In addition, Hulme (2008) cites similar imagery of control, mastery, or
conquering climate change that seem almost utopian or brash in his discourse studies
on environmental risk.
When compared with my initial hypotheses for each constituency, the results
were surprising. Climate change was characterized as a threat throughout the
documents; but it was more often framed as an opportunity for either global cooperation
or economic growth. In his opening statement to the COP 15 plenary, former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, “Climate change threatens the entire human family.
Yet it also provides an opportunity to come together and forge a collective response to a
global problem” (cited in Methmann & Rothe, 2012, p. 329). These themes of universal
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collaboration and partnerships among countries, industry, and community were frequent
in my coding, as well; but so was imagery of prosperity and economic opportunity
stemming from the climate crisis. Business interests, unlike in my hypothesis, did not
debunk the science or risk of climate change, but rather sought greater involvement in
the climate regime, often positioning themselves as experts and innovators for the
future. Murphy and Murphy (2012) and Livesey (2002) cited similar themes in their own
discourse analyses – a competition between proponents of business-as-usual versus
actors championing a green economy. The same was true for documents in this study,
many of which presented themes of “eco-innovation” or “sustainable economic growth”
as pathways to future, more environmentally friendly development or technologies that
could halt or adapt to impacts of climate change. Even ENGOs, which I predicted would
frame climate change as a grave threat or battle for survival, also employed discourse
of opportunity to shape a new future.
One prediction that did align closely with my results, however, was that countries
most at risk or those already suffering the greatest the impacts of climate change more
often framed environmental changes as dangerous or a struggle. Another frequent
theme and imagery in these documents and studies of related climate change discourse
involved labeling vulnerable populations as “climate refugees” or “victims.” In their
research of global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu, Farbotko and Lazrus (2012),
they discovered that climate vulnerable populations, such as those on this small island
nation, were often depicted as victims and used as evidence of the climate crisis.
Additionally, they found that dominant global narratives, such as climate refugee
discourse, “can entrench vulnerable communities in inequitable power relations,
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redirecting their fate from their hands” (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012, p. 382). Cameron
(2011) shared equal concern for supposing the fate of small island nations was doomed
in Western environmental discourse. Following Foucault, Farbotko and Lazrus (2012)
asserted:
Representations of climate refugees, like any other representations, are neither
static nor innocent. According to Foucault, they are vehicles for power,
characterized by fluid, ongoing claims of inclusion and exclusion, dependent on
the interests of those engaged in them. (p. 383)
As such, particular attention is paid to climate change discourses of vulnerability and
victimization and discussed in the next chapter, in addition to a discussion of which
constituencies were more likely to frame climate change risk as an opportunity rather
than a threat.
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

Despite rhetoric of action and urgency in the struggle with environmental climate
change, the language of risk in the dataset is not as frequent as discourse of
responsibility and development. Rather than apocalyptic imagery often employed to
describe future impacts of global climate change (Methmann & Rothe, 2012), a majority
of high-level statements and submissions by countries and NGOs, regardless of
constituency, more often cited an opportunity to pursue sustainable growth in the face of
a changing climate than a fight for survival. Still, those who most identified with the risks
of climate change, either through examples of extreme weather or rising sea level, were
leaders from countries that the UNFCCC and IPCC already characterized as the most
vulnerable and suffering adverse impacts of climate change – the SIDS and many
African countries.
This chapter offers both a summative analysis to interpret latent underlying
content meaning (Neuendorf, 2001) and a detailed discursive analysis that explores the
most prominent framing and themes that simultaneously shape and reflect climate risk
rationale. As stated in the previous section, I employed open coding so as to organically
discover and identify discursive patterns in the documents, as outlined in Appendix B.
Once my coding was complete, I calculated word frequency through MAXQDA for each
constituency – countries, ENGOs, and BINGOs – to quantify key words identified in my
codes (categorizations, actions, and naming related to climate change and
environmental risk). Table 6 provides this breakdown of non-trivial word frequency for
countries’ high-level statements, reporting usage of the words “action” or “actions” about
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10 times greater than the word “crisis.” This finding – a call for “action” – was nearly
universal in countries’ high-level statements. Indeed, it was almost equally matched by
rhetoric of disapproval with past failures of the international climate regime – a theme
that will be discussed in the following section. Consequently, a clear risk perception that
climate change impacts must be addressed does exist; but its conflicts continue to lie in
countries’ failure to agree on preventative measures or necessary actions (Huang,
2009; Rothe, 2011).

Table 6: Countries’ word frequency, with percentage of overall words as a
measure of constituency dataset
Word(s)

Frequency

Percentage

Action(s)
Economic/Economies/ Economy
Impact(s)

242
168
135

0.39%
0.27%
0.21%

Future
Vulnerable/Vulnerability
Responsibility/Responsible/
Responsibilities
Challenge(s)
Technology
Sustainable
Political
Urgency/Urgent

127
118

0.20%
0.18%

117

0.19%

113
94
87
62
56

0.18%
0.15%
0.14%
0.10%
0.09%

Science/Scientific
Threat(s)
Risk(s)
Opportunity
Survival

49
43
39
37
25

0.08%
0.07%
0.06%
0.06%
0.04%

Crisis

24

0.04%
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In each of the three word frequency tables in this section, climate change was
more often characterized as a “challenge” than a “risk,” and only among countries’ highlevel statements (the largest of the three constituencies) is the frequency of “risk” nearly
equal to that of “opportunity.” In his research on risk communication, Hampel (2006)
suggested risk implies a scientific and evidence-based approach and a “different
conceptualization of the problem,” generally with an interactive element (p. 5). Of the
countries that characterized climate change as “risk” or “crisis” (as outlined in Table 6),
about a quarter were SIDS, while fewer than five were Annex I countries. In this
discourse arena, Micronesia made its intentions clear:

…if we in governments continue to deal with climate change merely as a
challenge instead of a crisis we are certain to dance around this crisis until it is
too late to overcome it.

Micronesia’s statement aligns with the work of Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006),
whose climate change perception research found that individuals related to climate
change through personal experiences and knowledge, and the most salient discourses
about climate change were connected with peoples’ locality.
A major focus for NGO submissions and statements is the inclusion of new
voices into the climate change regime, akin to Beck’s emergence of subpolitics and
counter-conducts (Pieck, 2013) that develop from risk society. Table 7 reports the high
frequency of calls for “participation” of civil society in ENGOs’ submissions to the
UNFCCC. Often these references were linked to the need for shared knowledge
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resources of climate change among the world’s population and a “right” to join in
international climate change discourse and action. The statement from the International
Federation of Medical Students’ Association to the UNFCCC illustrates this discourse:

Climate Change is widely recognized as the biggest global health threat of the
21st century, and the world in which today’s children are growing up in is
changing. It is only fair that children and young people, who hold the biggest
stake in our shared future, are empowered to take positive action…Youth
empowerment and education is a key part of the fight against climate change.

Table 7: ENGOs’ word frequencies, with percentage of overall words as a
measure of constituency dataset
Word(s)

Frequency

Percentage

Participation

263

0.95%

Information/Knowledge/
Awareness/Education

198

0.72%

Development/Developing/
Developed

144

0.53%

Public

140

0.51%

Action(s)

100

0.36%

Right(s)
Youth
Opportunity/Opportunities
Challenge(s)
Risk(s)
Threat(s)/Threaten

79
48
30
24
19
16

0.29%
0.17%
0.11%
0.09%
0.07%
0.06%

Table 8 reports BINGOs’ frequent concerns with countries’ development paths –
another theme that will be addressed in the following section – and abundant
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technology as discourse, consistent with Dryzek’s environmental problem-solving
taxonomy. Nippon Keidanren, or the Japan Business Federation, cites corporations’
critical role in “green” development and technology as the solution to climate change in
its submission to the UNFCCC:

Industries play key roles to realize global low-carbon society as the source of
technology and innovation. To tackle climate change, especially in the long run, it
is imperative that they disseminate and make maximum use of existing
technologies and develop innovative technologies.

This discourse is both prosaic and reformist – assuming a status quo of
economic growth and industrialization, but one that Tuler (1998) said is undergoing
“some pragmatic adjustment” (p. 66). These findings are consistent with Schlichting’s
application of framing theory to industries’ climate change communication strategies
from 1990 to 2010 – from scientific uncertainty and negative socioeconomic
consequences to industrial leadership and technological salvation. Indeed, Lund (2012)
identified industries’ growing utilization of technological innovation and expertise in
climate change discourse. Table 8 below illustrates BINGOs’ use of “expertise” more
frequently than “opportunity.” Also of note, are BINGOs’ desire to take an even greater
role in “international cooperation on climate change,” as this constituency’s high-level
statement indicates, along with assertions of a “critical [need] to develop enhanced
channels [in the UNFCCC regime] to benefit from the expertise and know-how of
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business.” Risk and threat framing are only used to assert BINGOs’ necessary
involvement in the negotiations.

Table 8: BINGOs’ word frequencies, with percentage of overall words as a
measure of constituency dataset
Word(s)
Development/Developing/
Developed
Technology

Frequency

Percentage

168

0.98%

Business(es)
Private
Environmental/Environment
Expertise
Opportunity/Opportunities
Economic/Economies
Challenge(s)
Risk(s)

114
108
92
37
28
20
18
17
8

0.67%
0.63%
0.48%
0.21%
0.16%
0.12%
0.11%
0.09%
0.05%

Threat

1

0.01%

This last table, Table 9, shows a comparison of the three UNFCCC
constituencies’ top five non-trivial word frequencies, of which the words “risk,”
“challenge,” and “danger” are not included.
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Table 9: Comparison of constituencies’ top five non-trivial word frequencies, in
order of frequency
Countries

ENGOs

Action(s)

Participation

Economic/Economies/
Economy

Information/Knowledge/
Awareness/Education

Impact(s)
Future
Vulnerable/
Vulnerability

Development/Developing/
Developed
Public
Action(s)

5.1

BINGOs
Development/
Developing/
Developed
Technology
Business(es)
Private
Environmental/
Environment

Discursive Themes

Three discursive themes emerge from the discourse identified in the documents:
an opportunity to shape the future; a continuation of the battle between North and
South; and dissatisfaction with the current climate change regime. Consistent with the
theories of Foucault and Hajer, these discourses give meaning to social and physical
phenomena (Feindt & Oels, 2005), while reflecting each actor or actor coalitions’ power
relations and cultural values. Within these discursive themes lie struggles of
development, human rights, morality, and accountability, all of which are discussed
below:
5.1.1 Climate Change Opportunities
In 2014, Canadian activist and critic of globalization Naomi Klein told The Atlantic
that climate change should be perceived as an opportunity to dramatically reinvent our
economic and social structures to tackle deeper issues of global sustainability, inequity
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and political fairness5. In other words, the climate crisis presents a chance for the world
collectively to question how it grows, how it distributes goods, and how we can work
together to shape our future. This reformist stance is certainly consistent with Beck’s
theorizing of reflexive modernity, and it is apparent in many of the UNFCCC statements,
particularly from ENGOs and non-Annex I countries. Several examples of this discourse
are below:

We now have the opportunity to transform current paradigms, [and prevent
further damage] by reducing inequalities, enhancing human rights and agreeing
collectively on a comprehensive approach to combat climate change and save
ecosystem integrity and humanity’s future. (Women and Gender Constituency,
2010)

Today the whole world community is striving for green growth, the countries are
discussing opportunities of the economic development by avoiding damage to
environment…to a new paradigm of development. (Kazakhstan, 2010)

We must now inject a new economic logic where it is more beneficial for nations
and communities to keep the trees up, than to chop them down. (Indonesia,
2010)

5

See Shaban (2014) for full interview.
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It is high time for mankind to adopt new models of development and divorce from
business as usual in order to protect life on Earth…however this may be taxing
and difficult now, we strongly believe that it is worth the sacrifices and it is
surmountable by applying the finest technologies the best innovative brains have
already produced. (Eritrea, 2010)

While Eritrea, an LDC member, offered the only mention in the dataset of
sacrificing status quo or dominant paradigms for a new model of development, each of
the examples above utilizes climate change impacts or future risks as a catalyst to
explore how we can respond differently to address international economic and social
issues. These statements also are similar in their dependence on technology or
innovation as a means to deliver such changes, typical of ecological modernization
discourse (Huber, 2004). Yet the above examples differ greatly from ecological
modernization theories favoring market-driven approaches toward “green” growth – best
represented by statements from Annex I parties and nations with emerging economies:

… in industry, politics and society, we now see climate policy as an opportunity
and a challenge, not as a threat…Because when we talk about fighting climate
change, we are always also talking about economic growth and development. So
the transformation is actually a growth strategy. (Germany, 2010)

Ecology and economies are not a contradiction in terms…The economy,
primarily the private sector, has an interest in investing, if we create the
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necessary incentives, ensure technology transfers and if new, environmentallyfriendly goods are affordable for consumers. (Switzerland, 2010)

India will not only be amongst the fastest growing economies in the world as
measured by GDP – Gross Domestic Product – but will also be amongst the
most responsible in ensuring a high rate of growth of the real GDP – Green
Domestic Product. (India, 2010)

Brazil has shown that economic growth, social justice and environmental
protection is not just compatible but represent a development strategy. (Brazil,
2010)

Consistent with Huber’s ecological modernization theory, these nations reject the idea
that development would degrade environmental conditions. Instead, climate change
forces us to “work together to turn this challenge into opportunities for economic growth
through the advancement of green technologies and energy solutions,” as Annex I
nation-state Malta suggested in its statement. Acquiring and applying these new
solutions also implies that countries could leapfrog technologically and institutionally, as
inferred in the statements from those with rapidly emerging economies. Climate change
for these countries presents an opportunity for economic growth, which in this discourse
outweighs risk.
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5.1.2 The Battle Between North and South
Another closely linked development discourse prominent in these documents
was clear conflict between the roles and responsibilities of developed versus developing
countries, or North versus South in addressing the risks of climate change. In the
examples below from global South countries and an ENGO, developed countries are
perceived at fault for blocking solutions to current and future climate change impacts for
which they bear responsibility:

The developed countries have before them once more the opportunity to make a
choice in favor of making commitments that entail true meaning instead of
continuing to cling to the selfish practices that have led the world into this
dangerous situation. (Cuba, 2010)

We do not have any more time for lengthy delaying tactics; annex 1 countries
need to demonstrate real leadership in this important area now! (Zambia, 2010)

Barbados continues to believe that narrow self interests will eventually give way
to our collective sense of humanity and fairness, to ensure a sustainable path for
current and future generations. (Barbados, 2010)

The continued over-occupation by the rich of the remaining atmospheric space
and the failure to accept responsibility for deep emission reductions consistence
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with science and equity is indeed a travesty of justice. (Friends of the Earth,
2010)

These examples evoke notions of fairness and justice, which frequently arose in
the dataset when addressing the Southern countries’ rights – whether it is a right to
develop (as evidence in Trinidad and Tobago’s statement below) or a right to survive
(as in the Philippines and Botswana’s statements below). Rather than evoking rights
discourse, the global North was more apt to call for a tempered solution that sought
compromise among all parties (as in the statements from the United Kingdom and Italy
below):

We believe that equity issues need to be defined…on the rights of all countries to
develop sustainably and not at the expense of others. (Trinidad and Tobago,
2010)

Vulnerable countries such as the Philippines should not be made to feel like we
are the defendants in this TRIAL FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL. (Philippines, 2010)

We live with compromises but bearing in mind that you are asking us to
compromise our existence for the sake of our shared common space to which we
bear no responsibility to the carbon dioxide emissions that threaten the rich and
poor. (Botswana, 2010)
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The answer has to be a compromise. We cannot do everything here. But we can
make progress on mitigation, deforestation, adaptation, finance, reporting and
more. And restore momentum to the global process. Concrete steps to the treaty
we want. (United Kingdom, 2010)

In this negotiation, we know that pitching our ambitions too high and too soon
could backfire, and prevent us from reaching the crucial, yet attainable results we
need. (Italy, 2010)

The statements from Trinidad and Tobago, the Philippines, and Botswana recognize the
agency of vulnerable populations, and their demands for the global North to assume
responsibility for addressing climate change impacts. While the global North was more
apt to characterize the negotiations as a long-term compromise (“The new climate deal
may not satisfy all,” the Czech Republic said in its high-level statement), strong
discourse of responsibility was still prominent among these nations:

We owe it to them – and to all other citizens of this world to whom climate
change is already now a fact of life – to end this week with a set of decisions.
(European Union, 2010)

As a developed nation New Zealand has a responsibility to assist our Pacific
Island neighbours who are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. (New
Zealand, 2010)
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This framing of self-responsibility, though, was not unique to global North countries.
Indeed, the global South invoked rights discourse and morality to address
environmental risks – and in at least one instance debunked the role of victim (akin to
the findings of Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012) to take action against climate change:

The most vulnerable countries must own up the fact that crying a victim will not
stop their farm land from drying or the sea level from rising. We too have a role
for the damages to our Climate, through destruction of our forests. And the world
is demanding the spirit of self-help. (Kenya, 2010)

We, therefore, have a moral obligation to save humanity from doom. (Solomon
Islands, 2010)

These discourses of obligation illustrate the collective responsibility shared by countries
to tackle the climate crisis, which many countries cited in their UNFCCC statements.
5.1.3 Criticism of Climate Regime
Iterations of morality and responsibility were not only apparent in the context of
development and collaboration in addressing climate change risks, but also in
frustrations with UNFCCC governance (also in Huang, 2009; Webb, 2007; Bulkeley,
2001). Prevalent in this discursive theme are calls for action – the more frequently cited
words in countries’ high-level statements. In the statements below, the risks of climate
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change are pitted against international governance, structural policymaking, and
proceedings:

…we don’t have the privilege to be unnecessarily bogged down on phrases and
words to be inserted or deleted in the negotiated text. We must act with utmost
urgency and due diligence to save lives of millions and their precious
civilizations. (Nepal, 2010)

We were extremely disappointed with the outcome of Copenhagen. It is a
tragedy to think that over a 110 heads of state could not unite to tackle climate
change in a meaningful way. (Tuvalu, 2010)

All eyes are upon us…The time for action is now. Let us ‘stop the talk and walk
the walk.’ We must get the job done for our planet; we must get the job done [for]
our children. (Belize, 2010)

The gravity of the crisis has escaped us. It has become lost in a fog of scientific,
economic, and technical jargon. Without bold action, it will be left to our children
to come up with the words to convey the tragedy of losing our homelands when it
did not have to be this way. (SIDS, 2010)

These statements reflect the risk of inaction in the fight against climate change,
while criticizing the structural forces enacted to address these ills. Huang (2009),
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McNamara and Gibson (2009), and Paavola and Adger (2006) reported consistent
growing frustrations from the most vulnerable nations – SIDS and many in the global
South – which are forced to simultaneously battle climate change risks on the ground
while making little headway toward solutions on the international stage. These
statements also are reflective of the hegemony of climate negotiations, and bias toward
the global capitalist system.6 Pidgeon and Butler (2009) found that contemporary risk
approaches aligned with dominant political rationalities in Western nations, but had
limited effectiveness in delivering aggressive climate policy aims for the international
community. In many ways, these risks of stalled action or preferential treatment toward
Annex I nations are as perceivably damaging as the risks of the future climate change
impacts. Interestingly, the United States does not mention the risks of climate change in
its high-level statement; instead focusing on the actions it has taken since Copenhagen
to operationalize what “our leaders agreed last year.” Global economic leader China, on
the other hand, declared itself a “victim to global climate change” and stated “the
international community must enhance cooperation to tackle it.”
This discursive theme of criticizing the UNFCC also represents a population of
environmental activists and supporters who have lost faith in the multilateral
negotiations. Bump (2012), who called the annual climate change conferences
“pointless,” also described them this way:
They are good for providing an excuse for the well-heeled to tour the world every
winter, but they are fruitless in terms of adopting remedies for global warming
and obviously ineffective in curtailing greenhouse gas pollution.
6

For an analysis of Western bias in international theory, see Young (2014).
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Indeed, this discursive theme was most prevalent among ENGOs, as illustrated in these
examples:

The world has not forgotten that for two decades we have failed to reach an
agreement that would accelerate firm actions to address and combat climate
change…The world is watching and you must not forget that you have the
privilege of representing us. You have been sent to listen and act to do the right
thing for the planet and its future. (Climate Action Network, 2010)

Representatives of Indigenous Peoples from all over the world attending this
climate conference collectively express our dismay and severe disappointment
over the lack of political will and good faith negotiations to truly and effectively
combat climate change. (IPO, 2010)

To be young and aware today is to see your elders – from doctors and scientists
to lawyers and bankers – telling us that we’re in the final countdown, with the risk
or runaway climate change mounting with everyday we run business as usual…
to be young and aware today is to be confused. To wonder why you can stand in
front of us and both call for change, and refuse to change. (YOUNGO, 2010)

It is not surprising that ENGOs, SIDS, and developing nations were the most vocal in
the urgency of addressing climate change and most critical of these efforts to date.
Paavola and Adger (2006) found that the most vulnerable typically had the least voice in
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the international climate regime, while also suffering (or are projected to suffer, in the
case of future generations) the most from these environmental risks; so these
constituencies’ cries for participation, for future generations, and for action resounded in
each of their high-level statements and submissions. In this set of documents, then, it is
not the risk of climate change and its damaging impacts that these nations and groups
fear most, but rather the risk of nations and world leaders not taking action to mitigate or
adapt to them.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought a better understanding of risk perceptions of climate
change in international negotiations. Drawing upon theorizing of risk society from Beck
and others, this thesis began with an examination of how risk is constructed and asked
whether explanations for such divergent responses to climate change could lie in
analyzing risk perceptions, because these perceptions influence our orientation and
actions toward environmental hazards. Like Beck, this thesis asserted that risk does not
standalone; it is socially constructed and evolves over time. Consistent with Beck
(2010a), Rothe (2011), and Thompson and Rayner (2000), this thesis argued that risk is
different from hazard, and from uncertainty; it is derived from perceptions embedded
within broader political discourses. As such, perceptions of ecological risk vary from
country and constituency without singular or universal definitions of “dangerous climate
change.” Of course, many countries and civil society groups claim in varying degrees to
already be impacted by climate change, through extreme weather events, changing
agricultural practices, or other adaptation methods and technologies. Indeed, this thesis
found that nearly every actor (at every level) admitted to facing environmental changes
to some extent; where they differed was in their framing of climate change as a crisis or
opportunity, as best fit their dominant political and social discourse.
6.1

Risk on an International Stage

With its submissions from countries and civil society constituencies, the
UNFCCC provides a comprehensive arena in which to study climate change risk
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perceptions. That is because the UNFCCC in many ways already embodies what Beck
and others consider a product of risk society, in which a transnational body of actors –
along with subpolitical actors outside the state – have come together to collectively
address a global risk that they cannot individually confront. Climate change has
exceeded the limits of national risk-management institutions, prompting a new risk
society that must “transcend the boundaries of national states and thus open up a
window of opportunity for a more cooperative international order to evolve” (Rothe,
2011, p. 332).
The documents analyzed in this thesis, however, do not universally offer evidence
of more cooperative international order. In fact, they often show countries’ and non-state
constituencies’ divergent reactions and responses to the problem. Reflecting the
cultural, political, economic, and social values from constituencies across the
international community, these statements also offer much more than risk perceptions
of climate change. They provide substantial evidence that climate change is not simply
an environmental question, but rather one of economic, political, and social norms.
Perceptions and responses to climate change are embedded within countries’ or actor
coalitions’ discourses of governance, modernization, environmentalism, and rights or
responsibilities. While nations and civil society appear united in the belief that climate
change implies at least some threat to existing ways of life, these constituencies differ in
their responses to such environmental risk. Ultimately, this thesis found evidence for
Hilde’s (2012) claim that the UNFCCC is a forum with “two-level norms”: despite some
“basic norms regarding climate change,” countries still revert to national self-interest at
the negotiating table (p.894).
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Using discourse analysis of high-level statements and submissions from 110
countries and 35 NGOs (environmental- and industry-focused), this thesis found that
nations and civil society perceived the risks of climate change in larger contexts of their
own development, economic growth, and social equity. Non-trivial words such as
“action,” “opportunity,” “rights,” and “future” were more frequently cited than “threat,”
“risk,” or “survival.” For some, the risks of climate change presented an opportunity; for
others, an illustration of the continued dominance of the global North; and for even
others, a reason to act locally for the sake of future generations rather than wait for
international cooperation. How each constituency perceived climate change was also a
reflection of how they perceived themselves – a victim, an expert, a leader, or a
protector.
In analyzing risk perceptions of climate change, this thesis sought to provide
some understanding for the different actions and responses of varying countries and
key non-state constituencies to our changing environment. While this study of risk
perceptions did not offer a comprehensive critique of the legitimacy of international
climate governance, several of its findings hint at the limitations of the current regime in
responding to global environmental crises. Like risk, the emergence of the world’s
environmental regime is socially derived. Lipschutz (1996) called international climate
governance “a reaction to certain processes of social transformation at work upon
human civilization and its constituent societies” (p. 1). Changing our response to the
climate crisis also would entail changing our perceptions. Or, as Lipschutz (1996)
described, changing “how we conceptualized global environmental change”:
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As often as not, damage to the environment is described in terms of its physical
characteristics – the declining numbers of a particular species, the loss of so many
inches of soil, the presence of so much pollution in air or water, the increase in
average global temperature or the decrease in stratospheric ozone concentrations –
with the implication that policy should focus on the things that can be counted
instead of the things that count. (p. 4)
Several LDCs and SIDS echoed this sentiment in their high-level statements to the COP
16, citing environmental damages in terms of inequitable and unsustainable
development, a loss of culture or way of life, and even damage to a sentient “Nature” or
“Mother Earth” from climate change. Others, such as Samoa, feared the impact of
inaction on future generations: “Individually and jointly we must make tough and bold
decisions to ensure that we cannot continue to develop in a manner that transfers to
future generations a debt they cannot pay and did not ask to inherit.”
Yet, for most countries – the primary actors in the climate regime – such solutions
continue to be difficult to accomplish. That is because states remain highly resistant to
imposing on themselves any “enforceable obligation” that would alter their social or
economic norms or institutions “in a serious way” (Lipschutz, 1996, p. 39). Achieving
such a shift would mean that governments must embrace a new “political will” that
“requires a convergence of interests among contesting groups and elites” (Lipschutz,
1996, 29).
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6.2

Change Beyond the State

The UNFCCC certainly has provided a first step toward addressing the global
problems of climate change by bringing parties together to collectively work on
environmental issues. But its current approach to climate change has diverged from its
original objective and principles – primarily to achieve stable atmospheric GHG
concentrations based on precaution and equity (Sagara, 2009). Indeed, Audrey Meyer,
director of the Global Commons Institute, a London-based think tank for global climate
solutions, described the limitations of the UNFCCC’s current negotiations:
The main problem of the present approach is that parties [countries] are still
negotiating what they perceive as their own interests or their own group interests.
We all know that we must come together into a unified reckoning, but there seems
to be an inability to come to order within the limits that now constrain us all.
(Sagara, 2009).
Consequently, the impetus and answer to achieve environmental accord may lie
beyond the state system. The rise of subpolitical groups is critical to Beck’s theorizing of
reflexive modernity, in which non-state actors begin to operate outside of, or beyond,
state lines to address issues of global risk. This thesis provided evidence that this
process is underway, yet far from achieving what Beck had envisioned. Today’s
UNFCCC regime offers examples of subpolitical activity with the increasing number of
NGOs participating in the negotiations. Indeed, such groups were critical in formulating
language for the first environmental agreements and alliances for presentation at the
1992 Earth Summit (Lipschutz, 1996). Yet Lipschutz (1996) has simultaneously cited
growing evidence for a “revolving door” among government, industry, and NGOs without
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a clear separating of funding sources or agendas (p. 51). Earlier in this thesis, I cited
Schroeder and Lovell’s (2012) finding that many national delegations also admit NGO,
municipal, or business representatives into their delegations, further blurring barriers
between state and non-state interests. Such collaboration between state and non-state
actors is necessary to reach certain aims within existing structures. The question is
whether these groups collectively can effect legitimate institutional change and a shifting
of norms to achieve a comprehensive binding solution to the climate crisis.
Throughout much of the world, Wapner (1996) said NGOs and community-based
organizations “have traditionally served as conduits for government policy” and “have
been unofficial arms of the government” (p. 106). But for those groups that do not, the
effects have been transformative:
They can take control of their own lives and environments and no longer fall easy
prey to national or international pressures. Furthermore, the effects of their efforts
can fan out to the larger dynamics of international politics. (p. 106)
As such, Wapner (1996) cited groups as diverse as Indian activists resisting dam
development to Greenpeace’s non-violent actions “bearing witness” to harp seal killings
and nuclear testing off the coast of Canada and the U.S. Pacific Northwest as impacting
national and international policies because of their actions (p. 50). Several of the
ENGOs analyzed in this paper, particularly the youth-focused movements, have
achieved similar results, including Project Survival, an international youth journalism
network producing video and photo documentaries on survival and ingenuity in the face
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of climate change.7 Like its environmental NGO counterparts, Project Survival seeks to
garner greater awareness of the climate crisis through a growing network of global
media that ultimately will help to educate and influence new perceptions of the risks of
climate change to sway national and international opinion and action. Such examples
reflect Wapner’s (1996) idea that “states do not hold monopolies over the instruments
that govern human affairs but rather that nonstate forms of governance exist and can be
used to effect widespread change” (p. 7). Such civic activism is a form of governance,
Wapner (1996) argued, because it provides a way to create conditions to direct and
order others’ activities.
Ultimately, today’s climate governance might best align with Ken Booth’s
metaphor for the changing nature of global politics – the “international system which is
now developing…is of an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty; but alongside it
a global community omelette is cooking” (as cited in Lipschutz, 1996, p. 52).
Invigorating the climate change debate and influencing perceptions is not a top-down
approach. Indeed, answering the question of who rules climate change governance is a
multi-faceted one. Much of the regime’s implementation will take place at the regional
and local levels, “in the places where people live, not where their laws are made”
(Lipschutz, 1996, p. 250). For a climate regime to be successful, it must function as a
global institution with governance at the local, regional, national, and international
stages, changing perception at every level.

7

This group, whose work is available at http://projectsurvivalmedia.org, uses visual media of climate
change to encourage action and change perceptions about climate change, akin to Greenpeace’s
practice of “bearing witness” to link moral sensitivities with political responsibility (Wapner, 1996, p. 50).
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APPENDIX A: LISTING OF SAMPLE DOCUMENTS
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Countries High-Level Statements to COP 16
Nation/Regional
Groups

Language

Annex I

Annex II

Non
Annex I

LCD
Y

Party
Groupings 1
Asia-Pacific
Group
Eastern
European

Party
Groupings 2

Party
Groupings 3

Afghanistan

EN

Y

Albania

EN

Y

Algeria

EN

Y

OPEC

G-77

Alliance of Small
Island States
(AOSIS)

EN

Argentina

SP

Y

GRULAC

G-77

Australia

EN

Y

Y

WEOG

Austria

EN

Y

Y

Bangladesh

EN

Y

Umbrella
European
Union
Asia-Pacific
Group

Barbados

EN

Y

GRULAC

AOSIS

G-77

Belize

EN

Y

GRULAC

AOSIS

G-77

Bhutan

EN

Y

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

EN

Y

Botswana

EN

Y

African Group

G-77

Brazil

EN

Y

GRULAC

G-77

Brunei
Darussalam

EN

Y

Asia-Pacific
Group

G-77

Canada

EN

Umbrella

WEOG

China

EN

Asia-Pacific
Group

G-77

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y
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Asia-Pacific
Group
Eastern
European

G-77

WEOG
G-77

G-77
G-77

Party
Groupings 4

Nation/Regional
Groups

Party
Groupings 1
Eastern
European

Party
Groupings 2

Party
Groupings 3

Y

GRULAC

AOSIS

G-77

European
Union
European
Union

EN

Y

Asia-Pacific
Group
Eastern
European
European
Union
GRULAC

Eritrea

EN

Y

Estonia

EN

Y

European Union

EN

Y

Fiji

EN

Finland

EN

Gambia

EN

Y

Georgia

EN/SP

Y

Germany

EN

Ghana

EN

Greece

EN

Group of 77 and
China

EN

Guyana

EN

Iceland

EN

Language

Annex I

Croatia

EN

Y

Cuba

EN

Cyprus

EN

Y

Czech Republic

EN

Y

Denmark

EN

Y

Dominica

Annex II

Non
Annex I

LCD

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Asia-Pacific
Group
European
Union
African Group
Eastern
European
European
Union
African Group
European
Union

Y

Y

Y
Y

AOSIS

G-77

European
Union

Y

Y
Y

WEOG

African Group
Eastern
European

Y
Y

Party
Groupings 4

GRULAC

Y

WEOG
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AOSIS

G-77

WEOG
G-77

WEOG
G-77
WEOG

AOSIS

G-77

SIDS

Nation/Regional
Groups

Language

Annex I

Annex II

Non
Annex I

LCD

Party
Groupings 1
Asia-Pacific
Group
Asia-Pacific
Group

India

EN

Y

Indonesia

EN

Y

Iran

EN

Y

Ireland

EN

Israel

EN

Italy

EN

Jamaica

EN

Japan

EN

Kazakhstan

EN

Y

Asia-Pacific
Group

Kenya

EN

Y

African Group

Lao

EN

Y

Latin American
and Caribbean
Group (GRULAC)

EN

Least Developed
Countries Group

EN

Lebannon

EN

Y

Lesotho

EN

Y

Liberia

EN

Y

Liechtenstein

EN

Y

OPEC
European
Union
WEOG
European
Union
GRULAC

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y

Umbrella

Y

Party
Groupings 2
G-77
G-77
Asia-Pacific
Group

AOSIS
Asia-Pacific
Group

G-77

Asia-Pacific
Group

G-77

Y

African Group

G-77

Y

African Group
Environmental
Integrity
Group

G-77
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G-77

WEOG

Asia-Pacific
Group

Y

Party
Groupings 3

WEOG

G-77

Party
Groupings 4

Nation/Regional
Groups

Language

Annex I

Annex II

Non
Annex I

LCD

Y

Macedonia

EN

Malawi

EN

Y

Malaysia

EN

Y

Maldives

EN

Y

Malta

EN

Marshall Islands

EN

Y

Mauritius

EN

Y

Micronesia

EN

Y

Mongolia

EN

Y

Montenegro

EN

Y

Mozambique

EN

Y

Namibia

EN

Y

Nepal

EN

Y

Netherlands

EN

Y

Y

New Zealand

EN

Y

Y

Nigeria

EN

Norway

EN

Pacific Small
Island Developing
States

EN

Party
Groupings 2

African Group

G-77

Asia-Pacific
Group
Asia-Pacific
Group
European
Union
Asia-Pacific
Group

Y

African Group
Asia-Pacific
Group
Asia-Pacific
Group
Eastern
European
Y

Y

Y
Y

Party
Groupings 1
Eastern
European

Y
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Party
Groupings 4

G-77
AOSIS

G-77

WEOG
AOSIS

G-77

AOSIS

G-77

AOSIS

G-77

G-77

African Group

G-77

African Group

G-77

Asia-Pacific
Group
European
Union
Umbrella

Party
Groupings 3

G-77
WEOG
WEOG

African Group

OPEC

Umbrella

WEOG

G-77

SIDS

SIDS

Nation/Regional
Groups

Language

Annex I

Annex II

Non
Annex I

LCD

Pakistan

EN

Y

Palestine

EN

Y

Philippines

EN

Y

Poland

EN

Y

Portugal

EN

Y

Republic of Palau

EN

Y

Republic of
Suriname

EN

Y

Romania

EN

Russia

EN

Rwanda

EN

Y

Y

Samoa

EN

Y

Y

Saudi Arabia

EN

Y

Seychelles

EN

Y

Sierra Leone

EN

Y

Singapore

EN

Y

Slovakia

EN

Y

Slovenia

EN

Y

Party
Groupings 1
Asia-Pacific
Group

Party
Groupings 2

Party
Groupings 3

Party
Groupings 4

G-77

G-77
Asia-Pacific
Group
Eastern
European
European
Union
Asia-Pacific
Group

Y

G-77
European
Union
WEOG
AOSIS

SIDS

GRULAC

AOSIS

G-77

Y

Eastern
European

Y

Umbrella

European
Union
Eastern
European

Y

African Group
Asia-Pacific
Group
Asia-Pacific
Group

AOSIS

G-77

OPEC

African Group

AOSIS

African Group

G-77

Asia-Pacific
Group
Eastern
European
Eastern
European
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G-77

AOSIS
European
Union
European
Union

G-77

G-77

SIDS

Nation/Regional
Groups

Language

Annex I

Annex II

Non
Annex I

LCD

Solomon Islands

EN

Y

Y

Somalia

EN

Y

Y

South Africa

EN

Y

South Korea

EN

Y

Sri Lanka

EN

Y

Sweden

EN

Y

Y

Switzerland

EN

Y

Y

Tajikistan

EN

Tanzania

EN

Thailand

EN

Y

Timor Leste

EN

Y

Trinidad and
Tobago

EN

Y

Turkey

EN

Tuvalu

EN

Y

Y

Uganda

EN

Y

Y

Ukraine

EN

United Arab
Emirates

EN

Y
Y

Y

Y

Party
Groupings 1
Asia-Pacific
Group

Party
Groupings 2

Party
Groupings 3

Party
Groupings 4

AOSIS

G-77

SIDS

African Group

G-77

African Group
Environmental
Integrity
Group
Asia-Pacific
Group
European
Union
Environmental
Integrity
Group
Asia-Pacific
Group

G-77

African Group
Asia-Pacific
Group
Asia-Pacific
Group
GRULAC

Y

Y
Y
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Asia-Pacific
Group
Asia-Pacific
Group

Asia-Pacific
Group
G-77
WEOG
WEOG
G-77
G-77
G-77
AOSIS

G-77

AOSIS

G-77

WEOG
AOSIS

African Group

G-77

Umbrella

Eastern
European

Asia-Pacific
Group

OPEC

SIDS

G-77

Nation/Regional
Groups

Non
Annex I

Party
Groupings 1

Party
Groupings 2

Y

European
Union

WEOG

Y

Umbrella

WEOG

Language

Annex I

Annex II

United Kingdom
and Northern
Ireland

EN

Y

United States

EN

Y

Vanuatu

EN

Y

Vietnam

EN

Y

Zambia

EN

Y

Zimbabwe

EN

Y

LCD

Y

Y
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Asia-Pacific
Group
Asia-Pacific
Group

AOSIS
G-77

African Group

G-77

African Group

G-77

Party
Groupings 3

Party
Groupings 4

G-77

SIDS

NGO Submissions to COP 16
Date

August 20 2010

Organization(s)
Clean Energy Nepal (CEN); Energy Crossroads (EC); European
Youth Forum (YFJ); Federation of Young European Greens
(FYEG); International Federation of Liberal Youth (IFLRY);
International Federation of Medical Students Association
(IFMSA); International Forestry Student Association (IFSA);
Jeunes Volontaires pour l'Environnement (JVE); Service Civil
International (SCI); SustainUS; UK Youth Climate Coalition
(UKYCC); World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts
(WAGGGS)

August 16 2010

Corporación Grupo Tayrona

August 16 2010

European Youth Forum (YFJ) and World Association of Girl
Guides and Girl Scouts (WAGGGS)

August 27 2010

International Federation of Medical Students' Associations

August 20 2010

United Kingdom Youth Climate Coalition (UKYCCC) on behalf
of YOUNGO

August 2010

YOUNGO

August 15 2010

Climate Action Network International (CAN)

August 16 2010

Climate Action Network International (CAN)

August 16 2010

Climate Action Network International (CAN)

March 22 2010

Climate Action Network International (CAN)

March 22 2010

Climate Action Network International (CAN)

August 18 2010

Friends of the Earth International (FOEI)

August 16 2010

GenderCC - Women for Climate Justice
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Topic

Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

New Delhi Work
Programme; Article 6
New Delhi Work
Programme; Article 6
New Delhi Work
Programme; Article 6
New Delhi Work
Programme; Article 6
New Delhi Work
Programme; Article 6
Enhance engagement of
observer organizations
Clean development
mechanism
Nairobi Work Programme

ENGO/BINGO

ENGO (youth)

ENGO (youth)
ENGO (youth)
ENGO (youth)
ENGO (youth)
ENGO (youth)
ENGO
ENGO
ENGO

Standardized baselines
Adaptation Fund under
Kyoto
Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

ENGO

Nairobi Work Programme

ENGO

ENGO
ENGO

Date

Organization(s)

Topic

ENGO/BINGO

September 9
2010

GenderCC-Women for Climate Justice (GenderCC) on behalf of
Life e.V.; Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF);
Women's Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO)

Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

ENGO

August 16 2010

Global Witness on behalf of the Ecosystems Climate Alliance

Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

ENGO

August 31 2010

Joint submission by Climate Action Network-International
Secretariat (ENGO Focal Point); International Federation of
Agricultural Producers (Farmers Focal Point); ICLEI-Local
Governments for Sustainability (LGMA Focal point); GenderCC
(Women and Gender Focal Point); Service Civil International
(YOUNGO Focal Point)

Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

ENGO

August 16 2010

Life e.V. and GenderCC-Women for Climate Justice

August 16 2010

WWF International

September 1
2010

Business Council for Sustainable Energy (BCSE); Carbon
Markets & Investors Association (CMIA); Global Wind Energy
Council (GWEC); International Council for Sustainable Energy
(ICSE); International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)

Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

BINGO

August 16 2010

Carbon Markets and Investors Association

Clean development
mechanism

BINGO

March 23 2010

Climate Action Reserve

Standardized baselines

BINGO

March 22 2010

EURELECTRIC

Standardized baselines

BINGO

August 12 2010

Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC)

Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

BINGO

March 22 2010

Global Wind Energy Council

Standardized baselines

BINGO

August 16 2010

International Chamber of Commercie (ICC)

Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

BINGO

March 23 2010

International Emissions Trading Association

Standardized baselines

BINGO

August 16 2010

Keidanren

Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

BINGO
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New Delhi Work
Programme; Article 6
Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

ENGO
ENGO

Date

Organization(s)

Topic

ENGO/BINGO

March 22 2010

Transport Research Foundation

Standardized baselines

BINGO

August 16 2010

World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)

Enhance engagement of
observer organizations

BINGO

NGO High-Level Statements to COP 16
Organization(s)

ENGO/BINGO

BINGO (on behalf of constituency)

BINGO

International Trade Union Confederation

BINGO

YOUNGO (on behalf of constituency)

ENGO

International Indigenous Peoples' Forum on
Climate Change

ENGO

Farmers (on behalf of constituency)

ENGO

ICAE (on behalf of Women and Gender)

ENGO

Friends of the Earth

ENGO

Climate Action Network International

ENGO
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MAXQDA CODE CLASSIFICATIONS & DEFINITIONS

Climate Change Characterizations – This code includes any characterizations of
climate change in the selected documents. Specific sub-codes cover climate change
characterizations as (a) a crisis; (b) dangerous and/or destructive; (c) adverse impacts
and/or effects; (d) catastrophic; (e) a battle or fight; (f) a challenge; (g) a risk; (h) a
“tipping point;” (i) a threat; and (j) irreversible or unavoidable.
Damage from Climate Change – Examples include descriptions of physical damage
associated with climate change, to include flooding, human death, sea level rise and
other destructive outcomes associated with increased weather activity.
Controlling Climate Change – Examples include “tackling” or “solving” climate change.
Sub-codes involve language of (a) avoiding climate change; (b) reversing the impacts of
climate change; and (c) utilizing technology as a tool against climate change impacts.
Time – Coded examples involve language that refers to a time element related to
climate change, particularly a sense of urgency to address climate change impacts.
Additional references include a countdown to act.
Call for Action – Often closely related to the “Time” code, this code involves language
depicting a need to act or for action from the parties of the UNFCCC process or as a
reaction to climate change impacts.
Collaboration – Examples include language of collaboration or working together to
address the impacts of climate change, whether as part of the UNFCCC process or
beyond.
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Responsibility and/or Accountability – This code marks language associated with
those having a responsibility to respond to climate change impacts. This code was often
found in the context of developed versus developing countries and those who had the
least impact on the climate suffering the worst impacts. Sub-codes include references to
(a) human-made or anthropogenic and (b) morality, as a moral obligation to respond to
climate change.
Risk Management and/or Prevention – Examples involve language of resilience and
adaptation to the risks associated with climate change. This code is separate from other
descriptions of climate change throughout the documents, as specific adaptive action or
measures toward resilience must be included in this classification.
Failure at UNFCCC – This code includes references in the documents to perceived
shortcomings of the UNFCCC process and a failure of the parties to act.
Victimization – Examples include using the word “victims” to describe anyone who
suffers due to climate change impacts.
Opportunity – This code captures the language of opportunity, future or optimism in the
selected documents. It often is in reference to action at the UNFCCC but also revolves
on language associate with growth. As such, a sub-code involves economic growth.
Mother Earth or Nature – This code includes references to “Mother Earth” or nature as
sentient.
Science – This code involves references to the science of climate change and scientific
findings or predictions. A sub-code captures language of skepticism toward science.
Choices and Decisions – This code is closely tied to “Call for Action” and involves
references to choices or decisions as actions that one can take against climate change.
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It implies that climate change and its affects are not foregone conclusions, and that
parties have the ability to take action, but it must be through choice and active decisionmaking.
Future Generations – This code marks any mention of future generations or children
and grandchildren in the selected documents.
Survival – This code includes language of survival as related to the impacts of climate
change and the UNFCCC process the selected documents.
Vulnerability – This code covers any language of being vulnerable or populations
defined as vulnerable in reference to the impacts of climate change; often a
characterization of nations in the selected documents.
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